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Executive Summary
This report analyzes the fire protection and life safety systems of the Christopher Cohan Center. The
building was assessed from both a prescriptive and performance-based approach.
The prescriptive design analyzed the code requirements for the building based on the 2018 IBC, with
some consideration for the codes in place at the time of construction. The prescriptive analysis main
focus was on egress systems, fire alarm and detection, fire suppression, and structural fire protection.
The egress analysis found that the exits and exit configuration were sufficient for the occupant loads
that were calculated for the building. The fire alarm and detection system was found to meet the
requirements for providing an emergency voice evacuation system and most of the locations of required
devices. However, it was found that smoke detector spacing in some spaces was insufficient and that
there may have been a lack of coordination for the placement and monitoring of duct detectors. The
building is equipped with an automatic fire sprinkler system and is provided with required monitoring
components and was designed in accordance with NFPA 13. The initial installation of the fire sprinkler
system would have met the code requirements, as the water supply with a fire pump was able to meet
the most demanding remote area. However, the fire sprinkler system in the building was modified by
the removal of a fire pump, which resulted in a slight deficiency in water supply. The structural fire
protection was found to meet the prescriptive code requirements of the 2018 IBC for heights, areas, and
occupancy separation requirements. As part of the prescriptive portion of the report, two design fires
were modeled to assess the affects of fire on the strength of the steel members. One design fire found
that the member may fail, although this was a worst-case fire for a single member and significant
structural failure may not occur from a single failure. The main issue found in the prescriptive analysis
was the lack of sufficient water supply for the fire sprinkler system, which could be addressed as
described in the recommendations portion of this report.
The performance-based analysis was performed based on design fires and tenability criteria. The
tenability criteria were toxicity, heat flux, temperature, and visibility. The limits were set at 683 ppm for
CO concentration, 5.75 kW/m2 for heat flux, 60 °C for temperature and 13 meters for visibility. Two
design fires were considered, however one design fire on the stage was chosen to be analyzed in further
detail with an FDS model. The design fire considered a scenario where both the fire sprinkler system
failed to control the fire and where the 2-hour rated proscenium curtain failed to activate. A Pathfinder
model was also used to determine the egress time from the main hall, where the design fire was
located. The performance-based analysis found that occupants would be able to egress from main hall,
and that tenability would be maintained largely in part due to the activation of the smoke exhaust vents
at the top of the stage. While the performance-based requirements were met, some recommendations
were made including the improvement of the sprinkler system as well as the improvement of the
detection system in the stage area. With the improvement of the detection system in the stage area,
smoke vents could open earlier and the proscenium curtain could be activated automatically with the
implementation of projected beam smoke detection.
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Introduction
This report will analyze the fire and life safety systems of the Christopher Cohan Center from a
prescriptive and performance-based perspective. The following sections will outline the prescriptive
analysis of the life safety, fire alarm and detection, fire suppression, and structural fire protection
systems. Following these sections, the performance-based analysis will be presented which includes
computer-based modeling for egress and a simulation of selected design fires. Finally, recommendations
will be provided to help improve any deficiencies found in the analysis.
The Christopher Cohan Center is part of the larger Performing Arts Center (PAC) located on the campus
of the California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. In addition to the Christopher Cohan
Center, the Performing Arts Center consists of the Davidson Music Center and the Alex and Faye Spanos
Theatre. These buildings are located near Grand Avenue and are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Cal Poly Performing Arts Center
The Christopher Cohan Center features a total of 6 stories, with 5 above grade. The building is not
considered a high-rise building as the highest occupiable floor is located 52 feet above the elevation of
fire department access. Plans (not including the highest Catwalk Level) are shown in Figures 2-6 and are
also included in Appendix A.
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Figure 2. Trap Room/Lift Pit Level.
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Figure 3. Orchestra Level.
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Figure 4. Lobby Level
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Figure 5. Lower Balcony Level.

5|Page

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Figure 6. Gallery (Upper Balcony) Level.
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Applicable Codes and Standards
Construction of the Christopher Cohan Center was completed in 1996, but the building was designed to
the 1992 California Codes. The following provides a list of some of the reference codes used during the
design process:
•
•
•
•
•

California Building Code (1992)
California Fire Code (1992)
California Electrical Code (1991)
California Mechanical Code (1992)
California Plumbing Code (1991)

For the purposes of this report, the 2018 edition of the International Building Code (IBC) will be used
along with referenced standards. In some circumstances, the 2018 edition of the Life Safety Code (NFPA
101) will also be referenced. The following provides an example of some of the other NFPA standards
utilized in this report:
•
•
•

NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code

Prescriptive Analysis
Egress Analysis
The prescriptive egress analysis for this building is based on the IBC Chapter 10. In order to meet the
requirements of the IBC, egress capacity is compared to occupant load for each room and for each floor
as a whole. In addition, arrangement of exits in order to account for acceptable common path distance,
travel distance, dead end length, and separation of exits is checked. In certain areas and on certain
floors, a specific number of exits are required, and this was checked as well. Finally, recommendations
for the placement of exit signage will be included.
Prescriptive egress capacity is based on the size of egress components such as doors, corridors, ramps,
and stairs. Since the building is equipped with an automatic sprinkler system throughout and voice
alarm communication, the egress capacities are allowed to be increased per IBC Chapter 10. Stairway
capacity is calculated with a capacity factor of 0.2 inch per occupant and other egress components such
as door capacities are calculated with a capacity factor of 0.15 inch per occupant.

Occupant Load Factors
The occupant load factor for each room is based on Table 1004.5 in the IBC. There are two types of floor
areas that can be used in calculations: net and gross. Gross floor area refers to “the floor area within the
inside perimeter of the exterior walls of the building under consideration, exclusive of vent shafts and
courts, without deduction for corridors, stairways, ramps, closets, the thickness of interior walls,
columns or other features.” Net floor area refers to “the actual occupied area not including unoccupied
accessory areas such as corridors, stairways, ramps, toilet rooms, mechanical rooms, and closets.” [2]
When there are multiple occupant load factors in a building that combine net and gross, the following
calculations are made:
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Apply the gross area figure to the gross area of the portion of the building devoted to the use for
which the gross area figure is specified, and
Apply the net area figure to the net area of the portion of the building devoted to the use for
which the net area figure is applied.

The following occupant load factors were used:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Main Hall, loggias, Dress Circle, balconies, classrooms: Assembly with fixed seating, number of
fixed seats
Storage, machine rooms/electrical/mechanical, etc. (where included), equipment room:
Accessory storage areas, mechanical equipment room, 300 gross sq.ft/person
Piano, stage: Stage, 15 net sq.ft./person
Lobby, founder’s lounge: Unconcentrated assembly, 15 net sq.ft./person
Restrooms (where included), wardrobe, service, workroom, reception: Business, 150 gross
sq.ft./person
Concession, communications: Concentrated business, 100 gross sq.ft./person
Dressing Rooms: Locker room, 50 gross sq.ft./person

Rooms that are not included in net calculations but are included in gross calculations were included or
not included based on the nearest adjacent occupancy. For example, bathrooms connected/adjacent to
gross areas such as dressing rooms were included in the calculation while bathrooms located near the
Main Hall areas were not included because they were considered part of the net occupancy area.

Occupant Loads
The occupant load for each room was calculated by dividing the appropriate floor area by the occupant
load factor and rounding up to the nearest occupant. The occupancies and occupant load for each room
as well as stairs and corridors are shown in Figures 7-11 by floor. To obtain floor occupant loads, the
room occupancies were summed.
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Figure 7. Trap room/lift pit level room occupancies.
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Figure 8. Orchestra level room occupancies.
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Figure 9. Main Entry/Lobby level room occupancies.

11 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Figure 10. Lower Balcony level room occupancies.
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Figure 11. Upper Balcony level room occupancies.
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Table 1 summarizes the occupants loads shown in the above figures.
Table 1. Occupant Load Summary by Floor.
Floor

Use
Storage, Equipment, Chair
Wagon Lift

Trap Room/Pit Level

Orchestra

Main Entry/Lobby Level
Lower Balcony Level
Upper Balcony Level

Occupant Load
33

Main Hall, Loggias, Stage,
Dressing Rooms, Rehearsal
Pavilion, Classroom
Dress Circle, Lobby,
Reception, Concessions
Balcony, Lounge, Control
and Sound Room
Balcony, Storage
Total:

1901
774
244
158
3110

Egress from Rooms
The calculation of room occupant load was discussed in the previous section. Next, the doors in each
room were measured and divided by the capacity factor to determine the egress capacity for each room.
The capacity of egress from each room must be equal to or greater than the occupant load for the room.
Tables 2-6 summarize the egress capacity of each room and whether the capacity is enough.
Additionally, in spaces where one form of egress led to another, the egress component with lower
capacity was used.
Table 2. Room egress capacity for trap room and pit level.

Floor

Room

Use

10

Trap Room
(Below)

11 Trap Room

12A/B
Trap
Room
and Lift
Pit
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Capacity
Occupant
Egress
Factor
Exit
Load in
Sufficient?
Available (in./perso Capacity
Room
Notes
n)
Need to egress room 10&room 11.
8 2 X 36" Doors 0.15
480 YES
Capacity needed: 19
11 132",36" Doors 0.15

1120 YES

12 Storage

1 36" Door

0.15

240 YES

Machine Room
13 Pump Room
14 Electrical

1 36" Door
1 36" Door
2 36" Door

0.15
0.15
0.15

240 YES
240 YES
240 YES

15 Electrical

1 72" Door

0.15

480 YES

16 Mech. Room

1 36" Door

0.15

240 YES

17 Plumbing Room

2 72" Door

0.15

480 YES

18 Mech. Room

3 72" Door

0.15

480 YES

19 Electrical

2 36" Door

0.15

240 YES

Room 11 egress through room 10
Need to egress room 12 & 12A/B.
Capacity needed: 2
Room 12A/B egress through room
12

Egress directly to public way. Not
included in floor level calculation
Egress directly to public way. Not
included in floor level calculation
Egress directly to public way. Not
included in floor level calculation
Egress directly to public way. Not
included in floor level calculation
Egress directly to public way. Not
included in floor level calculation
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Table 3. Room egress capacity for orchestra level.

Floor

Room

100

101
101A
101B
101C
101D
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
110A
111
111A
112
113
113A
Orchestra
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
120A/B
121
122
123

Lounge/Galleries

0

Main Hall
Storage
Loggia East
Loggia West
Piano
Stage
Restroom
Electrical
Storage
Storage
Storage
Food Handling
Green Room
Dressing Room
Dressing Room
Dressing Room
Dressing Room
Manager/Receiving
Security
Security
Wardrobe
Dressing Room
Wardrobe
Dressing Room
Dressing Room
Dressing Room
Dressing Room
Restroom
Dressing Room
Wardrobe
Janitor

846
1
10
11
12
270
6
1
1
3
1
5
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
4
6
5
13
8
13
9
2
4
4
1

124

Classroom

180

124B
125
126
127

Classroom
Restroom
Restroom
Storage

1
1
1
1

128
129
130
131
132
133/134
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Use

Occupant
Egress
Load in
Available
Room

Rehearsal Pavilion
Janitor
Electrical
Storage
Restroom
Restroom

455
1
1
1
3
5

60" Door, 2X
144" Stair, 2
X 66" Doors
2 X 36"
Door,
2 X 72" Door
72" Door
39" Stair
39" Stair
72" Door
5 X 36" Door
36" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
90" Door
32" Door
2 X 90" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
90" Door
32" Door
32" Door,
72" Door
90" Door,
66" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
108" Door,
4 X 42" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door
32" Door

Capacity
Factor
Exit
Sufficient?
(in./perso Capacity
n)
Notes
See floor Where doors/corridors lead to
level
stairs, the most conservative
calculation capacity along path is used

0.15
0.15
0.2
0.2
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15

1440
480
195
195
480
1200
240
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
213
600
213
1200
213
213
213
213
213
213
600
213

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

693 YES

0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15

1040
213
213
213

YES
YES
YES
YES

0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15

1840
213
213
213
213
213

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Egress through main hall
Egress shared with main hall
Egress shared with main hall
Egress through main hall

Required capacity includes 110A
Egress through 110
Required capacity includes 111A
Egress through 111
Required capacity includes 113A
Egress through 113

Required capacity includes 124B
Egress through 124
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Table 4. Room egress capacity for entry and lobby level.

Floor

Room

Entry Lobby

Use

200

Lobby

593

201
201A
201B

Dress Circle
Organ
Royal Box

133
1
6

202
203
203A
204

Concession
Boiler Room
Boiler Room
Electrical
Communications
Room

205
206
207
207A
208 (A,B,C,D)

Capacity
Factor
Exit
Sufficient?
(in./perso Capacity
n)

Occupant
Load in Egress Available
Room

Mech. Room
Electrical
Electrical
Reception

9 X 60" Door, 32"
Door
2 X 32" Door
32" Door
32" Door

0.15

3813 YES

0.15
0.15
0.15

426 YES
213 YES
213 YES

32" Door
3
3 72" Door
2 2 X 32" Door
4 72" Door

0.15

213 YES

0.15
0.15
0.15

480 YES
426 YES
480 YES

32" Door

0.15

213 YES

0.15

613 YES

0.15
0.15
0.15

426 YES
426 YES
360 YES

4
6
9
3
7

60" Door, 32"
Door
2 X 32" Door
2 X 32" Door
2 X 36" Door

Notes

Egress capacity including 203A
Egress through 203

Converge into 2 stairs (44" and 36"),
capacity 400 (acceptable)
A,B,C,D converge into main room

Table 5. Room egress capacity for lower balcony level.

Floor

Room

Use

300 Circulation

301 Lower Balcony
Control/
Sound Room
303 Storage

302

Balcony Level

304 Founder's Lodge
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
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Service
Restroom
Storage
Main Communication Room
Organ Blower Room
Electrical
Storage
Workroom
Restroom
Storage

Capacity
Occupant
Egress
Factor
Exit
Load in
Sufficient?
Available (in./perso Capacity
Room
n)

172 4 X 32" Door

0.15

5 30" Door

0.15

1 30" Door

0.15

Notes
See floor
350 level
Door leads to stair but
calculation stairs are limiting factor
Doors connect to stairs
852 YES
but doors are limiting
factor
Stairs lead to door but
200 YES
door is limiting factor
200 YES

45 66" Door

0.15

440 YES

0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.2
0.15
0.15

200
200
200
200
200
480
200
210
200
200

0 70" Stair

2
3
1
2
1
1
1
6
3
1

30" Door
30" Door
30" Door
30" Door
30" Door
2 X 36" Door
30" Door
42" Stair
30" Door
30" Door

0.2

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Table 6. Room egress capacity for gallery (upper balcony) level.

Floor

Room Use

400 Circulation

Gallery

401
402
403
404
405
406

Upper Balcony
Storage
Storage
Storage
Equipment Room
Equipment Room

Capacity
Occupant
Egress
Factor
Exit
Load in
Sufficient? Notes
Available (in./perso Capacity
Room
n)

0 32" Door

152
2
1
1
1
1

4 X 30" Doors
30" Door
30" Door
30" Door
30" Door
30" Door

0.15

0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15

See floor
level
213 calculation

800
200
200
200
200
200

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Doors lead to stairs
but doors are
limiting factor

All floors meet the 2018 IBC requirements for room egress capacity. It should be noted that the IBC has
a minimum door clear width of 32” (IBC 1010.1.1) and a minimum stair width of 44” (IBC 1011.12). Some
doors in this building are equipped with 30” doors, so while they serve a sufficient capacity for the
rooms, they are not large enough to meet the overall door requirement.

Egress from Floors
In addition to requiring sufficient capacity for egress from each room, each floor is required to provide
sufficient capacity for the total occupant load on that floor. Figures 12-16 show how the egress paths
from main occupied areas to floor level exits.

Figure 12. Floor level exits for pit level and trap room level.
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Figure 13. Floor level exits for orchestra level.
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Figure 14. Floor level exits for main entry and lobby level.
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Figure 15. Floor level exits for balcony level.
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Figure 16. Floor level exits for gallery (upper balcony) level.
Next, the floor level exit capacity was found by calculating the individual capacity of each floor level exit
and summing the capacities. Where there were multiple egress components in series, the lowest
capacity was used. Tables 7-11 summarize the occupant load of each floor and the egress capacity that
is available.
Table 7. Floor egress capacity for trap room and pit level.

Floor
Trap Room
and Lift Pit
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Door/
Occupant Doors/
Corridor Stairs
Load
Corridors
Capacity
24

2 X 36"

480

2 X 48"

Floor Capacity
Stair
(Smallest value
Capacity between doors,
corridors, stairs)
480

480

Sufficient?

YES
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Table 8. Floor egress capacity for orchestra level.

Occupant
Load

Floor

Orchestra

1901

Egress
Available
Floor Exit
(Smallest
Sufficient?
Capacity
capacity along
path)
3 X 72" Door,
32" Door, 2 X
66" Door, 90"
Stair

2983

YES

Table 9. Floor egress capacity for main/entry level.
Egress
Available
Occupant
(Smallest
Load
capacity
along path)

Floor

Main/Entry
Level

774

Floor Exit
Sufficient?
Capacity

9 X 60" Door,
32" Door

3813

YES

Table 10. Floor egress capacity for balcony level.

Floor

Balcony
Level

Egress
Available
Occupant
(Smallest
Load
capacity
along path)
244

3 X 70" Stair

Floor Exit
Sufficient?
Capacity

1050

YES

Table 11. Floor egress capacity for gallery (upper balcony) level.

Floor

Gallery
(Upper
Balcony)
Level
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Egress
Available
Occupant
(Smallest
Load
capacity
along path)
244

3 X 32" Door

Floor Exit
Sufficient?
Capacity

639

YES
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As seen in the tables above, the exit capacity of each floor was found to be sufficient. Since this
building’s main occupancy is assembly, the main exit is required to meet half of the occupant load for
the building (IBC 1029.2). This building main exit can serve a capacity of 3813 occupants which exceeds
the total building occupancy of 3110 occupants and therefore meets the requirement.

Travel Distance, Common Path, and Dead-End Corridors
Chapter 10 of the IBC specifies maximum lengths for travel distance to an exit, common path lengths,
and dead-end corridor lengths based on the occupancy and other factors for the building. A common
path of egress travel is defined by the IBC as “that portion of exit access travel distance measured from
the most remote point of each room, area, or space to that point where the occupants have separate
and distinct access to two exits or exit access doorways.” [2]. The travel distance is the distance that it
takes an occupant to reach the exterior of the building or a protected path of egress travel (such as a
smoke protected stairway). Since this building does not separate the occupancies on each floor, the
most restrictive requirements must be met which are those for an assembly occupancy except for the
trap room and pit level which is storage occupancy. Table 12 provides the requirements for the three
types of measurements considered for assembly occupancies.
Table 12. Travel distance requirements for assembly occupancy.
Measurement Requirement Code Section
Common Path
75 feet
1006.2.1
Travel Distance
250 feet
1017.2
Dead End
20 feet
1020.4

For the trap room and pit level, the largest travel distance is shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Trap room and pit level longest travel distance.
The trap room and pit level is subject to the requirements for a storage occupancy which are as follows:
common path, 100 feet; and travel distance, 250 feet. There are no dead-end corridors on this floor. As
seen in the above figure, the largest travel distance in the trap room and pit level is 145 feet, which is
acceptable. The largest common path in this room is 84 feet which is also acceptable.
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Figure 18. Orchestra level longest common path and travel distance.
On the orchestra level the longest travel distance is 199 feet which originates in the main hall and exits
near the classroom as shown in Figure 18. This is shorter than the maximum allowed travel distance of
250 feet. The longest common path is found in the restroom in the lower left corner and is 60 feet which
is lower than the maximum allowed. There are no dead ends on this level.
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Figure 19. Main/entry level longest travel distance.
On the main lobby level, there are not many long egress paths. There are no large rooms with a single
exit, so the common path requirement is met. As shown in Figure 19, the longest travel distance on this
level is from the dress circle seating, which is 142 feet in length and less than the maximum of 250 feet.
There are no dead ends on this level.

Figure 20. Balcony level longest travel distances.
On the balcony level, there are no lengthy common paths and no dead-end corridors. As shown in Figure
20, the longest travel distance is from the lower balcony seating and is 139 feet, which is less than the
250-foot maximum.
25 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

The gallery (upper balcony) level is very similar in construction to the lower balcony level and none of
the three requirements were exceeded on this level either. Therefore, each level meets the
requirements for travel distance, common path, and dead-end corridors.

Number and Spacing of Exits
In addition to limiting the travel distances, there are requirements for the number and spacing of exits
within areas of floors and on floors. For rooms of assembly occupancy and less than 50 occupants, one
exit per room is permitted so long as the common path does not exceed 75 feet. For business and
storage occupancies that are sprinkler protected, one exit is permitted so long as the common path does
not exceed 100 feet. All common paths were already checked and did not exceed 75 feet. Additionally,
all spaces with one exit had occupant loads of less than 50. For occupant loads greater than 50 and up to
500, 2 exits are required. For occupant loads between 501 and 1,000 three exits are required and four
are required for occupant loads greater than 1,000 (IBC 1006.2). Balconies, galleries or press boxes
having more than 50 seats must have two means of egress with one from each side (IBC 1029.5). In
addition to providing multiple exits, two of the exits must be placed at least one third of the overall
diagonal of the space apart. When there are three or more exits, the additional exits must be spaced
reasonably.
The following spaces require more than one exit. The list gives the number of exits supplied and the
number of exits (required), as well as figures with exit spacing:
•

Main Hall: 4 provided (3 required)

26 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

•

Stage: 5 provided (2 required)

•

Rehearsal Pavilion: 4 provided (2 required)

•

Classroom: 2 provided (2 required)
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•

Dress Circle: 2 provided (2 required)

•

Lobby: 5 provided (3 required, however more will likely be required for egress from floor, see
next section)

•

Lower Balcony: 4 provided (2 required)
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Upper Balcony: 4 provided (2 required)

The areas have a proper number and spacing of exits. Chapter 10 of the IBC also states requirements for
the amount and spacing of floor level exits. Table 13 shows the required number of exits based on the
floor occupant load.
Table 13. IBC Table 1006.3.2. Number of exits required from each story.

Additionally, a single exit may be allowed in certain occupancies with low occupant loads. For this
building, this applies to the trap room and pit level, based on IBC Table 1006.3.3(2). The same separation
of exits requirement as above are required on a floor level as well. Based on this information, the
29 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

following is the required number of exits from each story along with the number provided and a figure
showing separation distance:
•

Trap room/pit level: 2 provided (1 required)

•

Orchestra level: 7 provided (4 required)
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•

Main/entry level: 10 provided (3 required)
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•

Lower balcony level: 3 provided (2 required)

•

Gallery (upper balcony) level: 3 provided (2 required)

32 | P a g e

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

As shown, each story meets the requirement for number of exits and exit separation.

Assembly Fixed Seating
In assembly occupancy with fixed seating, IBC Chapter 10 specifies a capacity of the aisles, similarly to
how the capacity of a door is calculated. The capacity of the aisle is determined by multiplying the width
of the aisle by a factor from IBC Section 1029.6.1 because the assembly seating is not smoke protected.
The factor used is based on total number of seats within the space exposed to smoke-protected
environment and the type of aisles. Since the Main Hall aisles have a slope of less than 1:12, the capacity
factor of 0.20 inches/person is used. In the main hall seating area, the aisles are 44 inches wide on each
side of the seating areas, therefore each aisle can serve a capacity of 220 occupants. These aisles must
also comply with the requirements of 1029.9.1 which specifies a minimum aisle width for aisles leading
to an exit to be 42”, which is met.
For seating in rows, there is also a requirement for the clear width of the aisles between the rows. The
required width of the aisle is based on the number of seats and whether there are aisles or doorways at
one or both ends of the row. For rows where there is an aisle at both ends, the minimum clear width is
12 inches, and the row width must be increased by 0.3 inch per seat beyond 14 seats. For rows where
there is only an aisle or door at one end, the row width is increased by 0.3 inches from 12 inches for
each seat in addition to 7. The minimum clear width is not required to exceed 22 inches, however. In the
PAC, the balcony and dress circle seating have 22” clear widths and therefore meet the requirement. In
the orchestra level, the longest row is 42 seats, which means that the required clear width is 20.4
inches. The orchestra seating has 21-inch clear width aisles, so this requirement is met.
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Exit Signage
Chapter 10 of the IBC provides requirements for the locations of exit signs within a building. According
to IBC 1013.1, exit signs must be placed in the following locations:
•
•
•
•

Exit and exit access doors
Path of egress travel to exits and within exits to indicate direction of travel when path/exit are
not immediately visible
Must be placed such that at any point in an exit access corridor, there is an exit sign within 100
feet or the listed viewing distance (whichever is less).
Not required in rooms or areas that only require one exit or exit access.

Following these requirements, suggested locations for exit signs are provided Figures 21-25.

Figure 21. Exit sign locations for lift pit and trap room level.

34 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Figure 22. Exit sign locations for orchestra level.
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.
Figure 23. Exit sign locations for main entry/lobby level.
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Figure 24. Exit sign locations for lower balcony level.

Figure 25. Exit sign locations for gallery (upper balcony) level.
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Egress Analysis Conclusion
As summarized in the sections above, the egress systems of the Christopher Cohan Center were
analyzed to determine if the requirements of the 2018 IBC were met. Occupant loads of each space and
floor were calculated and compared with available egress widths based on a sprinklered building. Where
multiple exits were required, it was verified that they were sufficiently separated to prevent blockage of
multiple exits. Additionally, requirements based on the assembly occupancy such as main exit sizing and
aisle width in the orchestra seating were verified. Finally, locations for exit signs were suggested since
existing exit sign locations were not know. Based on this analysis, the Christopher Cohan Center was
found to meet the prescriptive requirements for egress. The following section will provide a similar
prescriptive analysis of the interior finish requirements of the building.

Interior Finish
The interior finish requirements for this building are based on IBC Chapter 8. There are some general
and some occupancy specific requirements. Floor and wall finishes are tested using the following
methods:
•

•

•

NFPA 286:
o Description of test: Full-scale room-corner test, wall materials installed on walls or
ceiling material installed on ceiling. 40 kW gas burner is placed in corner for first five
minutes, then 160 kW fire for additional 10 minutes
o Acceptance criteria (IBC 803.1.1.1):
 During the 40 kW exposure, flames shall not spread to ceiling.
 The flame shall not spread to the outer extremity of the sample on any wall or
ceiling.
 Flashover, as defined in NFPA 286, shall not occur.
 The peak heat release rate throughout the test shall not exceed 800 kW.
 The total smoke released throughout the test shall not exceed 1,000 m2.
o Acceptance above is considered to also comply with Class A requirements of ASTM
E84/UL 723.
NFPA 265:
o Description of test: Room-corner test for textile wall covering installed on walls. Gas
burner is placed in corner at 40 kW for 5 minutes then 150 kW for an additional 10
minutes.
o Acceptance criteria (IBC 803.5.1.1):
 During the 40 kW exposure, flames shall not spread to the ceiling.
 The flame shall not spread to the outer extremities of the samples on the 8-foot
by 12-foot walls.
 Flashover, as defined in NFPA 265, shall not occur.
 The total smoke release throughout the test shall not exceed 1,000 m2.
ASTM E84/UL 723:
o Description of test: Steiner tunnel test. Horizontal test specimen is placed in a tunnel
and the flame spread down the tunnel is recorded. Smoke-developed index is also
measured. Results are in terms of Class A, B, or C with A being the lowest flame spread.
o Description of classes (IBC 803.1.2):
 Class A: Flame spread index 0-25; smoke-developed index 0-450.
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Class B: Flame spread index 26-75; smoke-developed index 0-450.
Class C: Flame spread index 76-200; smoke-developed index 0-450.

Certain interior finishes, such as high-density polyethylene (HDPE), have specific requirements that are
held across all occupancies. This is summarized in the Table 14.
Table 14. Interior ceiling and wall finish requirements for all occupancies
Finish Material/Type
Test Standard (Requirement)
Material less than 0.036
Not required to be tested
inch thick
Foam plastics
Not allowed (Exception: IBC 2603.9)
NFPA 265: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
803.5.1.1 (see above)
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
Textile wall covering
803.1.1.1 (see above)
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A and must be protected
with automatic sprinkler system
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
803.1.1.1 (see above)
Textile ceiling coverings
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A and must be protected
with automatic sprinkler system
NFPA 265: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
803.5.1.1 (see above)
Expanded vinyl wall
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
coverings
803.1.1.1 (see above)
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A and must be protected
with automatic sprinkler system
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
803.1.1.1 (see above)
Expanded vinyl ceiling
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A and must be protected
coverings
with automatic sprinkler system
High-density
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
polyethylene and
803.1.1.1 (see above)
polypropylene
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
Site-fabricated Stretch
803.1.1.1 (see above)
Systems
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A, B, or C
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
Laminated products with
803.1.1.1 (see above)
wood Substrate
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A, B, or C
NFPA 286: Meet all requirements listed in IBC
Facing or veneer applied
803.1.1.1 (see above)
over Wood substrate
ASTM E84/UL 723: Class A, B, or C
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In addition to these requirements, there are specific requirements for individual occupancies. For the
Christopher Cohan Center, A-1 occupancy is used since there is no occupancy separation, however the
requirements are the same for the other occupancies in the building. The following are the
requirements for interior finishes for walls and ceilings tested with ASTM E84/UL 723 (materials that
comply with requirements in IBC 803.1.1.1, see above, are considered Class A) for A-1 occupancies that
are sprinklered (IBC Table 803.13):
•
•
•

Interior exit stairways and ramps and exit passageways: Class B
Corridors and enclosure for exit access stairways and ramps: Class B
Rooms and enclosed spaces: Class C

Additionally, interior finish material that are applied to fire-resistance-rated or noncombustible building
elements must meet the requirements of Class A unless they are protected by an automatic sprinkler
system on both sides, are attached to noncombustible backing or furring strips, or where the
combustible void is filled with a noncombustible material (IBC 803.15). There are some other minor
requirements for walls and ceilings finishes that are not likely to apply to this building that can be found
in IBC Chapter 8.
The interior floor finish and floor covering materials are also subject to the requirements of IBC Chapter
8. Interior floor finishes and covering materials are tested to ASTM E648 or NFPA 253 and are required
to be not less than Class II rating for assembly, business, and storage occupancies. In addition, floor
covering materials must comply with the requirements of the DOC FF-1 “pill test” or ASTM D2859. Since
the building is equipped with automatic sprinkler’s, materials tested with the DOC FF-1 “pill test” or
ASTM D2859 are permitted where Class II materials are required.

Fire Alarm and Detection System
The fire alarm system provided in the Christopher Cohan Center is equipped with numerous types of
detection devices and a public notification system. The system was originally built as a Simplex fire
alarm system but was later replaced with Notifier devices. Detection is provided through smoke
detectors, heat detectors, sprinkler waterflow switches, duct detectors, and manual pull stations. The
system utilizes speakers to allow for pre-recorded messages to be transmitted throughout to help with
egress. The fire alarm control panel (FACP) in the building is an NFS-640 model located in the Security
Room #149 on the main entry level. The FACP is connected to the University Police Department central
monitoring services to transmit alarm messages to the fire services as needed.
The fire alarm system consists of Class A wiring for the signaling line circuit (SLC), audio and visual
notification circuits. The remaining circuits were all wired as Class B. Since the SLC and the notification
circuits are wired Class A, a break in the wiring will still allow the devices to operate properly through
the redundant loop. For the Class B circuits, a single open will cause loss of functionality for the devices
downstream.
An important piece of information when reviewing a fire alarm system is the operation matrix. The
operation matrix explains what will happen at the control panel when each device initiates a certain
signal. Depending on the signal, the FACP may send an alarm signal to the notification devices, or a
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trouble or supervisory signal may appear. Unfortunately, the system operation matrix did not scan
correctly, but it was filled in with the assumed operations as shown in Figure 26.

Figure 26. System Operation Matrix
The initiating devices produce an alarm signal that activates the notification circuits and security, while
other inputs such as a tamper switch will only produce a supervisory signal without notifying occupants.
This aligns the goal in mind of only notifying occupants when they are in danger and need to evacuate.
This operational matrix is very simple and does not indicate things such as when door holders are
released, what happens when a circuit is damaged (open, ground, or short), or when dampers will
operate.

Central Station Signal Disposition
The original plans indicate that the system is to be connected to a central monitoring station. The
central station is required to meet certain signal disposition requirements as addressed in NFPA 72
Section 26.3. As discussed previously, three types of signals are transmitted to the FACP (and in turn to
the central station): alarm, trouble, and supervisory. The disposition of these three types of symbols
shall be as follows:
Alarm Signals: The central station shall perform the following actions:
1. Retransmit the alarm to the communications center in accordance with 26.2.1 unless the signal
is a result of a prearranged test.
2. Dispatch a runner or technician to the protected premises to arrive within 2 hours after receipt
of an alarm signal if equipment needs to be manually reset by the prime contractor. Except
where prohibited by the authority having jurisdiction, the runner or technician shall be
permitted to be recalled prior to arrival at the premises if a qualified representative of the
subscriber at the premises can provide the necessary resetting of the equipment and is able to
place the system back in operating condition.
3. Immediately notify the subscriber unless the signal is a result of a prearranged test.
4. Provide notice to the subscriber or authority having jurisdiction, or both, if required
Supervisory Signals: Upon receipt of a supervisory signal that is not prearranged, the central station
shall perform the following actions:
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1. Communicate immediately with the persons designated by the subscriber and notify the fire
department, law enforcement agency, or both when required by the authority having
jurisdiction.
2. Dispatch a runner or maintenance person to arrive within 2 hours to investigate unless the
supervisory signal is cleared in accordance with a scheduled procedure determined by
26.3.8.3.3(1)
3. Notify the authority having jurisdiction and the subscriber when sprinkler systems or other fire
suppression systems or equipment have been wholly or partially out of service for 8 hours
4. When service has been restored, provide notice to the subscriber and the authority having
jurisdiction of the nature of the signal, the time of occurrence, and the restoration of service
when equipment has been out of service for 8 hours or more
Trouble Signals: Upon receipt of trouble signals or other signals pertaining solely to matters of
equipment maintenance of the alarm systems, the central station shall perform the following actions:
1. If a received trouble signal does not restore within 15 minutes, communicate immediately with
persons designated by the subscriber.
2. Dispatch personnel to arrive within 4 hours to initiate maintenance, if necessary
3. When the interruption is more than 8 hours, provide notice to the subscriber and the fire
department if so required by the authority having jurisdiction as to the nature of the
interruption, the time of occurrence, and the restoration of service

Initiating Devices
The initiation of the fire alarm system can be caused by many devices such as smoke and heat detectors,
manual pull stations, sprinkler waterflow switches, and duct smoke detectors. The detection is
considered to provide full coverage throughout the building and should detect a fire that occurs in any
space. Full floor plans showing the locations of detection devices, which are color coded, can be found in
Appendix B.
Smoke Detectors
Smoke detectors are one of the forms of automatic detection within the building. The smoke detectors
are photoelectric type and manufactured by Notifier. Smoke detectors are provided in each space
throughout the building, and must be spaced according to the following requirement from NFPA 72:
17.7.3.2.3.1: In the absence of specific performance-based design criteria, one of the following
requirements shall apply:
(1) The distance between smoke detectors shall not exceed a nominal spacing of 30 ft
and there shall be detectors within a distance of one-half the nominal spacing, measured
at right angles from all walls or partitions extending upward to within the top 15 percent
of the ceiling height.
(2) All points on the ceiling shall have a detector within a distance equal to or less than
0.7 times the nominal 30 ft spacing.
The detector spacing was analyzed in all spaces larger than 30 X 30 feet and found to be inadequate in
areas such as the main lobby and the foyer. The following (Figure 27) shows the deficiency in the foyer
when using the second method for measuring the spacing:
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Figure 27. Smoke detector spacing in foyer area.
Measuring with method 1 results in slightly smaller areas missing coverage due to the shape of the
foyer, but it still resulted in large portions with no smoke detector coverage.
Heat Detectors
Heat detectors are another common form of automatic detection in fire alarm systems. Heat detectors
in this building are used in spaces such as machine rooms, electrical rooms, and storage rooms in this
building. The heat detectors used in the building are listed for 50 X 50 foot spacing, but they are not
used in any rooms where two detectors would be required so the spacing was not checked. Heat
detectors are shown in purple on the plans shown in Appendix B.
Manual Pull Stations
Manual pull stations are provided as required by NFPA 72 Section 17.15. NFPA 72 requires manual pull
stations to be provided within 5 ft of each exit doorway on each floor and within 200 feet of travel
distance from any point measured horizontally along the floor. In this building, the manual pull stations
are generally located at main exits from assembly areas, in corridors, and beside stair and exit doors as
required by NFPA 72. Manual pull stations are indicated in red on the plans shown in Appendix B.
Waterflow Switch
Waterflow switches are provided on the fire sprinkler system in the building so that the fire alarm
system will be activated when a sprinkler operates. Waterflow switches are provided on each riser of
the system and are required to detect the flow of water within 90 seconds. Waterflow switches are
shown in blue on the plans shown in Appendix B.
Duct Smoke Detectors
According to the original mechanical plans, duct smoke detectors were installed at the inlet and
discharge of any fan or air handling unit (AHU) with higher than 2000 CFM of airflow. The mechanical
plans also specify that the fan or AHU must shut down upon activation of the duct smoke detectors.
However, the fire alarm plans make no note for the placement of the duct detectors (only shown on
plans) and do not include the shutdown of fans or AHU in the matrix of operations. Additionally, the
mechanical plans include duct detectors in many locations which are not shown on the fire alarm plans.
For example, in Figure 28, the mechanical plans show two duct smoke detectors in the pump room in
the basement while the fire alarm plans show only regular smoke detectors in the room.
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Figure 28. Mechanical plans showing two duct smoke detectors (left) while fire alarm plans show only
area smoke detectors (right).
Therefore, it is hard to deduce what the design goal for the placement of the duct detector was, and
how they were placed. The mechanical engineers were likely designing for smoke control, since the
detectors were meant to shut down fire smoke dampers which would help contain smoke within certain
zones. This concept is supported by the fire alarm plans since they include some locations where control
modules are labeled to be connected to dampers.

Notification Appliances
Notification devices are provided throughout as speakers and strobes. The building is mostly equipped
with combination speaker-strobes, while individual speakers and strobes are used in some spaces where
both are not needed.
The Christopher Cohan Center is required to have audible notification in all occupied spaces, and where
audible notification is required, it must provide the proper sound level above the normal ambient sound
in the space. The required sound level for the notification devices therefore can vary by space if the
ambient sound level changes. In each space, the notification devices must meet the following criteria:
18.4.4.1 To ensure that audible public mode signals are clearly heard, unless otherwise
permitted, they shall have a sound level at least 15 dB above the average ambient sound level or
5 dB above the maximum sound level having a duration of at least 60 seconds, whichever is
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greater, measured 5 ft above the floor in the area required to be served by the system using the
A-weighted scale (dBA).
The fire alarm documents do not state what the design sound levels were for the PAC, although a table
from NFPA 72 is provided for references in Figure 29.

Figure 29. NFPA 72 Table A.18.4.4 Average ambient sound level according to location.
This can give a rough idea that the ambient sound level throughout the theater and lobby spaces may be
60 dBA (places of assembly) or even higher while the sound level in the dressing spaces may be more
near to the 54 dBA of business occupancies. A 6 dBA change is significant and should be addressed by
using quieter devices in certain smaller spaces, and louder/more tightly spaced devices in the main
theater. The fire alarm plans indicate that the original speaker-strobe devices installed in the building
could provide a range of sound levels from 78 to 96 dBA at 10 feet from the device (this will decrease at
further distances). Therefore, the device could provide the required 15 dBA above ambient within its
range of settings for all areas in the building. However, Harman Hall is large and may experience louder
sounds than normal assembly spaces during performances. Therefore, it can’t be said with certainty that
the audible requirements will be met at every point within that area. However, visual notification is also
provided due to the public nature of the space and will assist in at least getting occupants’ attention.
The fire alarm system is required to follow the requirements for visual notification for public mode,
which is covered by NFPA 72 Section 18.5. Visual notification is required only in occupied spaces. The
spacing for strobes is based on the candela rating of the strobe and the size of the room. Larger candela
strobes can cover a larger area and therefore require less devices to be used. The following table (Figure
30) from NFPA 13 shows the maximum spacing for wall-mounted strobes:
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Figure 30. NFPA 72 Table 18.5.5.5.1(a) Room spacing for wall-mounted visual notification devices.
The strobes used for the Christopher Cohan Center originally only came in 15cd rating. Therefore, the
strobes can only cover a 20 X 20-foot area. While this candela rating is appropriate for corridors and
smaller spaces, it is not nearly enough for areas like Harman Hall and the lobby. As shown in Figure 31,
in Harman Hall the 15 candela strobes leave nearly the entire center of the hall without proper visual
coverage.

Figure 31. Coverage area for 15 candela strobes shown in Harman Hall.
46 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Harman Hall would need strobes with at least 54 X 54 foot spacing, which would require 110 candela
strobes. Spaces such as the lobby which are about 40 feet across could utilize 15 candela strobes on
both walls or 75 candela devices on one wall. The 15 candela strobes are appropriately spaced in many
of the smaller spaces, and no change would be recommended for those areas. The new speaker-strobes
that were installed allowed for adjustment from 15 to 110cd. It is possible that the lack of visual
coverage was noticed and corrected for with the replacement of the system, so long as the electrical
calculations were adjusted accordingly.

Other Fire Alarm System Components
Tamper Switches
Tamper switches are provided on each sprinkler system riser to monitor when sprinkler valves have
been partially or fully closed. If the valve is tampered with, a supervisory signal will be sent to both the
FACP and the central monitoring station (as indicated in the matrix of operations).
Door Holder
There are various locations in the building where it is convenient for doors to be normally open but need
to close during a fire scenario. In these cases, door holders are provided. These door holders normally
hold the doors in an open position to allow for free movement through the space but will release the
door when the alarm activates to close the doors. The locations of the door holders are denoted on the
plans in both Appendices B and C.
EVACS
The Christopher Cohan Center is equipped with an Emergency Voice/Alarm Communications System
(EVACS). The requirements for EVACS are provided in NFPA 72 Section 24.4. Some special requirements
include increased pathway survivability, and the ability to provide partial evacuation. Unfortunately, not
a lot of information is available on the specifics of the voice evacuation system in the building and how it
specifically is utilized to assist in evacuation. In general, voice alarm systems allow for recorded
messages that can help with more complicated egress procedures such as ones that would occur in a
large assembly space.

Fire Alarm Power Requirements
Fire alarm systems must be equipped with the proper power supply to power all components and must
be provided with secondary power in case of a loss of main power. These requirements are met in two
main forms: voltage drop calculations and battery supply calculations. The fire alarm system receives
power through a 120VAC which is then reduced to a nominal 24VDC. As the voltage travels along the
line out to devices and back to the control panel, the voltage is slowly lost due to resistance in the wires.
Therefore, the voltage drop needs to be calculated to ensure that the devices are receiving the
minimum voltage needed to operate, usually 16V. If calculations find that the voltage has dropped too
much to power the devices, either larger wires or shorter circuits will need to be used unless an auxiliary
power supply is added to further power the circuit.
The original fire alarm plans for the building include voltage drop calculations for the strobe circuits
which are shown in Appendix D. For this report, the calculation for the basement circuit will be shown in
Figure 32.
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Figure 32.Basement strobe circuit voltage drop calculation.
Unfortunately, the plans do not indicate which circuit each device is on, just the type of circuit.
Therefore, the distances between the devices cannot be confirmed. However, the calculation shows that
each strobe requires 0.115 A of current, which means that since there are 6 devices, the current at the
first device will need to be 0.115X6= 0.69 A, which is what is shown. The amperage and the resistance of
the line are used to calculate the voltage drop to each device, which is then added for the total voltage
drop. In the case of this circuit, the total voltage drop was 0.32511 V from an initial nominal 24V, which
would result in a large factor of safety for the terminal voltage which is 16V. This is the case across all
the circuits, and it is likely that the circuits were wired with so few devices for ease of maintenance
and/or installation rather than out of necessity for voltage drop. These voltage calculations are dated as
they are based on the original Simplex system, not the new Notifier system. However, it is assumed that
the devices were wired in a similar way during the replacement, and therefore the voltage drop will still
be minimal even if the new devices have higher currents.
NFPA 72 also requires that systems be provided with a backup source of power in case of loss of main
power. The following section shows the requirement:
10.6.7.2.1.2 The secondary power supply for in-building fire emergency voice/alarm
communications service shall be capable of operating the system under quiescent load
for a mini-mum of 24 hours and then shall be capable of operating the system during a
fire or other emergency condition for a period of 15 minutes at maximum connected
load.
This requirement is used to ensure that if power is lost for up to a full day, the system will still operate
for long enough to notify the occupants. The PAC is equipped with both a FACP and a miniplex, which
are equipped with their own batteries to meet the secondary power supply requirement. When the
new fire alarm system was installed, new battery calculations should have been performed to either size
new batteries or to confirm that the current batteries provided sufficient power. Even though some of
the new devices are known, the settings were not communicated nor are all devices known, so battery
calculations were performed for the old system and are shown in Table 15.
Table 15. Original system FACP battery calculation
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STROBE
DUCT
CTRL
IND
SS
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Wall Mount Strobe
Duct Detector
Control Zam
Remote Alarm Indicator
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STANDBY
CURRENT
PER UNIT
(AMPS)
1.5850
0.0000
0.0240
0.0100
0.0000
0.0000

QTY

X
X
X
X
X
X

1
9
11
7
2
90

=
=
=
=
=
=

TOTAL SYSTEM
STANDBY CURRENT (AMPS)
Prepared By:

REQUIRED
STANDBY
TIME (HRS)

Prepared by:

REQUIRED
STANDBY
CAPACITY
(AMPHOURS)

24

46.06

TOTAL
SYSTEM
STANDBY
CURRENT
(AMPS)

X

1.9190

=

2.7363

ALARM
CURRENT
PER UNIT
(AMPS)
21.0400
0.1000
0.0240
0.0400
0.0010
0.1150

=

QTY

X
X
X
X
X
X

1
9
11
7
2
90

=
=
=
=
=
=

TOTAL SYSTEM
ALARM CURRENT (AMPS)

1.9190
REQUIRED STANDBY REQUIRED
CAPACITY (AMPALARM
HOURS)
TIME
(HOURS)
NFPA 722002
4.4.1.5.3.1
46.0560
0.083
TOTAL CAPACITY
(AMP-HOURS)

REQUIRED
ALARM
CAPACITY
(AMPHOURS)
+

TOTAL
STANDBY
CURRENT
PER ITEM
1.5850
0.0000
0.2640
0.0700
0.0000
0.0000

48.7923

TOTAL
SYSTEM
ALARM
CURRENT
(AMPS)

X

TOTAL
CAPACITY
(AMPHOURS)

48.7923

32.8360

20%

32.8360
REQUIRED
ALARM
CAPACITY
(AMPHOURS)

=

SAFETY
FACTOR (%)

+

TOTAL
ALARM
CURRENT
PER ITEM
21.0400
0.9000
0.2640
0.2800
0.0020
10.3500

2.7363
ADJUSTED
BATTERY
CAPACITY
(AMPHOURS)

=

58.55

Using a 20% safety factor (as required by NFPA 72 Section 10.6.7.2.1), the system requires about 58.6
AH in battery power. Therefore, 60 Ah batteries should have been used. However, the system was sized
without a safety for an unknown reason.
It should be noted that the largest need for battery capacity comes from the standby needs. In the case
of the original system, under 6% of the battery capacity was caused by the alarm current needs.
Therefore, changes in the battery need would be highly dependent on the makeup of the FACP and its
modules since this made up most of the standby current. Although most of the alarm current is
determined by an amplifier (part of FACP) and the strobes, changes in these components will have a
smaller effect because of their low or zero standby current.

Smoke Control and Passive System Interlock Requirements
The Christopher Cohan Center is not provided with a smoke control system in accordance with IBC 909,
however there are requirements for shutdown of building ventilation systems and closing of opening
protectives upon activation of the fire alarm system. Additionally, the stage is required to be provided
with smoke vents, but this is covered in a later section of this report.
Although not required by the IBC 2018 Edition, the California Building Code (CBC) 2019 edition requires
elevator hoistways connecting more than two stories in Group A occupancies to be provided with
hoistway opening protection. In the Christopher Cohan Center, elevators are provided either with
elevator lobbies or additional elevator doors to meet the requirements of CBC 3006.3. These doors may
be on magnetic door holders during normal building operations, but the doors are required to be
released upon activation of the fire alarm system in order to prevent the spread of smoke through
elevator hoistways to other floors.
Smoke control is also provided for the building in the form of duct detection and interlock with AHU’s
and smoke or fire/smoke dampers. As discussed previously, there is some lack of consistency between
the fire alarm and mechanical drawings for the locations of duct detectors. Assuming a correct
installation, AHU’s and fire/smoke dampers are required to close upon initiation of the fire alarm system
to prevent the spread of smoke through ventilation systems. Additionally, duct smoke detectors are
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required to be provided at fire/smoke dampers and at the inlet of AHU’s with a capacity greater than
2,000 CFM. The associated AHU or fire/smoke damper is required to close only upon initiation of the
corresponding duct detector.

Fire Alarm Commissioning and ITM Requirements
The International Building Code provides the minimum requirements for the inspection, testing, and
maintenance that must occur at the commissioning of the system and periodically throughout the life of
the system. ITM requirements ensure that the system continues to follow the approved design
documents and standards. The IBC states the following requirements regarding the commissioning and
inspection, testing and maintenance of fire alarm systems:
907.7 Acceptance tests and completion. Upon completion of the installation, the fire alarm
system and all fire alarm components shall be tested in accordance with NFPA 72.
907.8 Inspection, testing and maintenance. The maintenance and testing schedules and
procedures for fire alarm and fire detection systems shall be in accordance with section 907.8 of
International Fire Code.
Therefore, both NFPA 72 and the International Fire Code (IFC) will be referenced for the inspection,
testing, and maintenance requirements. Refer to Appendix D for further information.

Fire Alarm and Detection Conclusion
As summarized in the sections above, the fire alarm and detection system of the Christopher Cohan
Center was analyzed to determine if the requirements of the 2018 IBC and NFPA 72 2016 edition were
met. The Christopher Cohan Center is provided with a voice alarm evacuation system as is required for
assembly occupancies of this size. Various forms of initiating devices are provided throughout the
building including fire sprinklers, smoke detectors, and manual pull stations. While the locations of some
devices such as manual pull stations met the prescriptive requirements, there are some areas lacking
smoke detector coverage. Additionally, it was noted that there may be discrepancies between the
location of duct detectors as shown in the mechanical plans in comparison to the fire alarm plans.
Notification is provided throughout the building by speakers, strobes, and combined speaker strobes.
The layout of notification appliances was sufficient in most areas with the exception of the main hall
area where strobes were found to be undersized. In conclusion, the fire alarm system in the Christopher
Cohan Center meets most of the general prescriptive requirements of the IBC such as system types and
the type of devices present but may be lacking coverage in some areas. The following section will
provide a similar prescriptive analysis of the fire suppression systems found within the building.

Fire Suppression Systems
The Christopher Cohan Center is protected throughout by a wet pipe, hydraulically calculated automatic
sprinkler system throughout the building. The sprinkler system is supervised with waterflow detection
devices at lateral connections to the riser and tamper supervision devices at all sprinkler water valves.
Central station monitoring is provided for all valve supervision and waterflow detection devices.
Additionally, the building is provided with standpipe risers which are combined with the automatic
sprinkler risers. Class II standpipes with 100 feet of hose and nozzle are located on each side of the stage
with a design criteria of 100 gallons per minute.

50 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Water Supply
The water-based fire suppression systems are currently supplied solely by the city water supply. At the
time of construction, the water supply was found to be insufficient, and a fire pump was installed. In
2001, it was requested that the fire pump be removed since “the required water pressure is now
achieved without the need for this pump”, as stated by the Cal Poly Facilities Department. The water
supply at the time was not listed in the letter to the Fire Marshal requesting removal. However, new
flow test data was determined from a project located nearby, on Grand Ave. The analysis will first
consider the original flow test with the fire pump and the new test with the fire pump removed.
The original city water supply was determined by a flow test performed on November 9, 1994. The flow
test was performed at the location shown in Figure 33.

Figure 33. Location of flow test
The flow test results are shown in Table 16.
Table 16. Flow test results

Flow Test 11/9/1994
Static
130 psi
Residual
Flowing

51 | P a g e

60 psi
1100 gpm

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and Marking of Hydrants, Section 4.1.1 states
that the ratings for hydrants be limited to a minimum residual pressure of 20 psi. Therefore, the city
water supply curve was cut off at approximately 1380 gpm as this corresponded with a head of 20 psi.
The fire pump that was originally installed in the building was rated for 750 gpm at 90 psi. Since no fire
pump curve was provided in the construction documents, the curve was generated using three points:
churn pressure (pressure at no flow), rated flow and pressure, and pressure at 150% rated flow.
Currently, NFPA 20 allows for fire pumps to reach 140% of rated pressure at churn. For this pump, that
would allow 126 psi when there is no flow in the system. However, the requirement used to be 120%,
and 120% is a more conservative pressure so a value of 108 psi (1.2 X 90 psi) was used. Section 6.2.1 of
NFPA 20 states “pumps shall furnish not less than 150 percent of rated capacity at not less than 65
percent of total rated head”, therefore the third point was 1125 gpm (1.5 X 750 gpm) with 58.5 psi (0.65
X 90 psi). This is summarized in Table 17.
Table 17. Fire pump curve data

Point

Flow (gpm) Pressure (psi)

1
2

0
750

108
90

3

1125

58.5

Notes
Assume 120% of rated pressure at
churn
Rated pressure and flow
NFPA 20: Required 65% of rated
pressure at 150% of rated flow

Using this information, as well as the city water supply information, a water supply curve was created
and is shown in Figure 34.
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Figure 34. Water supply curves.
The new flow test data was taken from a project constructing new dorms nearby. Figure 35 shows the
location of the Christopher Cohan Center and the new flow test.
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Figure 35. New flow test location.
The flow test was performed in 2016, with results as shown in Table 18.
Table 18. New flow test results.
Flow Test 2/4/2016
Static
114
psi
Residual
75
psi
Flow
2924 GPM

As stated in NFPA 13 and NFPA 20, the water supplies shall be capable of providing the required flow
and pressure for the greater of:
•
•

The standpipe flow and pressure requirements, or
The required flow and pressure for the remote design area including the hose stream allowance
for the required duration

In the following sections, the process of determining the water demand will be covered, and the
resulting demand will be compared to the supply that is described above. The building is equipped with
two standpipes combined with sprinkler risers that require a flow of 100 gpm. Since this demand is less
than the demand for the sprinkler system, the sprinkler system demand will be compared to the water
supply.

Automatic Sprinkler System Design Criteria
The automatic sprinkler system for the PAC is a hydraulically calculated, wet pipe system. The system
was evaluated using the control mode-density area method (CMDA method). The demand for the
system is calculated by performing a hydraulic calculation at a remote area of sprinklers. The
requirement for the density and area is determined using hazard classification. In addition to the
required density and area for the hydraulic calculation, a hose stream demand and duration must be
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included. The values were used for hazard classification for various areas of the building are shown in
Table 19.
Table 19. Design requirements for fire sprinkler system
Locations
Hazard Classification Density
Offices, auditorium
Light Hazard
0.1 gpm
seating areas
Storage areas,
Ordinary Hazard,
kitchen, mechanical
0.15 gpm
Group 1
equipment areas
Stage and orchestra
Ordinary Hazard,
0.20 gpm
pit
Group 2

Area

Hose Allowance Duration

1,500 SF

100 gpm

30 minutes

1,500 SF

250 gpm

60 minutes*

1,500 SF

250 gpm

60 minutes*

NFPA 13 Sections

Table 19.3.3.1.2,
Figure 19.3.3.1.1

*NFPA 13 provides a range of 60-90 minutes for Ordinary Hazard hose allowance. The lower of
the values is allowed to be used when the system is equipped with waterflow alarm devices and
supervisory devices that are monitored at a constantly attended location
This information will be used to calculate the demand for the hydraulically remote areas.

Automatic Sprinkler System Layout
In order to perform hydraulic calculations, the layout of the system must be analyzed. This section of the
report will cover the layout and size of system risers, cross mains, branch lines, and sprinklers.
The sprinkler system is connected to the underground piping at the bottom of the riser as shown in
Figure 36.

Figure 36. Fire sprinkler system point of connection (site plan view)
The following riser diagram shows the point of connection:
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Figure 37. Sprinkler system point of connection (riser view)
The riser shown in Figure 37 includes the required shutoff valves, pressure gauges, and flow switches.
The location of the fire department connection was not noted on the sprinkler plans. The building is
required to be provided with a fire department connection, which would have needed to be connected
on the outlet side of the fire pump and provide access for the fire department connection at a location
agreed upon by the AHJ. The piping upstream of the point of connection is located underground. The
underground piping is 6” ductile iron pipe. Also located upstream of the base of riser are a 6” PIV and a
6” Wilkins Model 950 double check backflow preventer. On each riser, there is a 4” butterfly valve and a
flow switch.
Appendix F shows the layout of the sprinkler piping within the building. Larger views will be shown in
the main text for the hydraulic remote area in the following section.

Sprinkler Types
The building is provided throughout with various types of Viking brand sprinklers, depending on the
location. Table 20 summarizes the sprinkler types, K-factor, activation temperature, and finish found in
the building.
Table 20. Sprinkler Types
Type
K-Factor
Viking "M" Upright
5.5
Viking "M" Pendant
5.5
Viking "M" Horizontal Sidewall
5.5
Viking "M" Vertical Sidewall
5.5
Viking "M" Quick Response Upright
5.5
Viking "M" Quick Response Pendant
5.5

Temp. (F)
200
155
155
155
155
155

Finish
Brass
Chrome
Brass
Chrome
Chrome
Chrome

The standard spray, standard response upright and pendant sprinklers found in the first two lines of the
tables are the main sprinkler types used throughout the facility. The horizontal sidewall sprinklers were
primarily located in the trap room under the stage likely due to space requirements as the branchline
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piping is ran alongside the structural beams supporting the stage. Vertical sidewalls were utilized
throughout the building in areas where their use was more feasible than running branchline piping to
the location that would be required for an upright or pendant sprinkler. Finally, quick response upright
and pendant sprinklers were provided on two levels in the box office area located near the performance
pavilion. The reasoning for using quick response sprinklers in this location but not others was not noted
on the fire sprinkler plans.

Hydraulic Calculations
Hydraulic calculations are used to ensure that the system demand can be met by the available water
supply. In simple systems, the remote area used for the hydraulic calculation can usually be identified
readily. This area will generally be at the highest elevation at the furthest point from the riser. This can
start to vary as different hazard classifications are added and as the system drifts away from a simple
tree or gridded system. The PAC is an example of a building where it is not possible to know the remote
area from simply looking at the plans. For example, the some areas have very long branch lines with
small diameters that could end up seeing a pressure loss that is greater than an area that is located at a
higher elevation. When the building was designed, the sprinkler contractor provided calculations for
many remote areas include the following:
•
•
•
•

Light hazard area located under the stage
Ordinary hazard area located in the kitchen, behind the stage on main level
Light hazard areas located in upper balcony
Ordinary hazard area located over the stage

The contractor did not list the outcomes of the hydraulic calculations on the plans; therefore, it is not
known which resulted in the highest demand. For this report, one remote area was selected to perform
a calculation. The area above the stage, at the catwalk level (highest level) was selected. This area was
selected because unlike other areas at the catwalk level, the area is ordinary hazard and therefore
requires a larger number of heads to be calculated and requires higher flows at those heads.
Figure 38 shows the remote area that was calculated, with the nodes for the sprinklers labeled. More
detailed drawings with all nodes labeled can be found in Appendix G.

Figure 38. Remote area used for hydraulic calculation
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This portion of the catwalk level above the stage was chosen because it is located the furthest from the
riser feeding that level. The area decided was based on the calculation performed by the sprinkler
contractor and verified that the requirements of NFPA 13 Chapter 27 were met. The resulting area
consists of 17 heads, with 4 heads on 4 branch lines and one on the remaining branch line. Normally, the
closest sprinkler to the main would have been chosen for the 5th branch line, but choosing the last
sprinkler resulted in a higher demand when performing calculations due to the pipe sizing.
The hydraulic calculation was performed using HASS, which is a node-based analysis for sprinkler
systems. Figure 39 shows the inputs to the system, which are like what could be input to an excel sheet
to perform the calculations.

Figure 39. HASS input screen
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In addition to adding the nodes, the water supply must be specified. As discussed, the calculation was
performed using the original flow test data with a pump and the new flow test data with no pump. The
calculation results for the flow test with pump are shown in Figure 40.
.

Figure 40. Hydraulic calculation results with pump.
The full output including flow at each node can be found in Appendix G. The system had sufficient flow
when the pump was present. This is shown graphically in Figure 41.

Figure 41. Hydraulic graph showing supply exceeds demand for the flow test with pump
For the second calculation, the water flow was just under what is needed to meet the system demand.
This is shown in Figure 42.

Figure 42. Hydraulic calculation results with no pump
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This is also shown graphically in Figure 43.

Figure 43. Hydraulic graph showing demand exceeds supply for the flow test with no pump.
Although the flow is just short of meeting the demand, these results show that the water supply did
increase after the original construction and that there likely won’t be significant failure of the sprinkler
system due to lack of water supply.

Fire Suppression Systems Commissioning and ITM Requirements
The International Building Code provides the minimum requirements for the inspection, testing, and
maintenance that must occur at the commissioning of the system and periodically throughout the life of
the system. ITM requirements ensure that the system continues to follow the approved design
documents and standards. Since the only fire suppression system in the building is the automatic
sprinkler system, the requirements as follows are for sprinkler systems. As the International Building
Code references NFPA 13 for the installation of sprinkler systems, initial acceptance testing of the
system is in accordance with NFPA 13. For routine inspection, testing and maintenance requirements,
the IBC states the following:
IBC 2018 Section 903.5: Sprinkler systems shall be tested and maintained in accordance with the
International Fire Code.
The IBC refers to the International Fire Code (IFC) for routine inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements. Table 901.6.1 in the IFC provides the referenced standards to be used for different fire
protection systems. The fire sprinkler system is required to be inspected, tested, and maintained in
accordance with NFPA 25. Refer to Appendix H for a summary of the requirements for initial acceptance
testing and routine maintenance of the system.
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Fire Suppression Systems Conclusion
As summarized in the sections above, the automatic sprinkler systems of the Christopher Cohan Center
was analyzed to determine if the requirements of the 2018 IBC and NFPA 13, 2016 edition were met. As
discussed, the water supply of the sprinkler system for the building has changed over time. Initially, the
city water supply had lower capacity and a fire pump was provided, but the fire pump was removed
later after improvements were made to the city water supply. A hydraulic calculation was performed for
the area above the stage as this was found to be the most hydraulicly demanding area. The calculation
found that the system was initially provided with a healthy safety margin for water supply, but after the
removal of the pump the supply is just below being sufficient. The sprinkler system should undergo a
further analysis to confirm this, and if still found to be insufficient, changes can be made to the system
piping to reduce pressure losses. In conclusion, the Christopher Cohan Center is provided with an
automatic sprinkler system that meets most of the requirements of NFPA 13, and the noted deficiency
should be corrected to ensure proper operation.

Structural Fire Protection
The following section will analyze the building’s structural fire protection. The prescriptive analysis will
cover code-based requirements such as the fire resistive construction, the building height and area, and
occupancy separations. A performance-based analysis (separate from the later performance-based
analysis) was also performed to determine the adequacy of the structure.

Construction Type and Fire Resistive Construction
The construction type for this building as stated by the original construction documents is Type II, fireresistive. However, the fire ratings for various components don’t match with the requirements of Type
IIA or Type IIB as stated in the IBC Table 601. This is demonstrated in Table 21.
Table 21. Fire resistance rating of building compared with Types I and II (IBC Table 601).
Building Element
Provided
IA
IB
IIA
IIB
Primary Structural Frame
2
3
2
1
0
Exterior Bearing Walls
4
3
2
1
0
Interior Bearing Walls
2
3
2
1
0
Exterior Nonbearing Walls See below* See below* See below* See below* See below*
Interior Nonbearing Walls
0
0
0
0
0
Floor Construction
2
2
2
1
0
Roof Construction
1
1 1/2
1
1
0

*Exterior nonbearing wall requirements are based on the fire separation distance which is discussed
below.
The building meets and most closely matches the requirements of Type IB construction, therefore
further requirements for this report will be based on this construction type. For exterior nonbearing
walls, IBC Table 602 is referenced and as shown in Table 22.
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Table 22. Exterior nonbearing walls fire resistive rating requirements. (IBC Table 602)

The Christopher Cohan Center is between 10 and 30 feet from other buildings on the sides that face the
Alex and Faye Spanos Theater and the Davidson Music Center. Nonbearing walls on the sides that face
the other theaters are at least one hour rated while walls on the other sides are of noncombustible,
non-fire-rated construction. This meets the requirements of the IBC.

Occupancy Separation
In buildings with mixed occupancies, IBC section 508 is used to classify occupancies as accessory,
nonseparated, or separated. To be considered accessory, the occupancy must be ancillary to the main
use of the building, must not occupy more than 10% of the floor area of each story, and must not
exceed the tabular values for non-sprinklered buildings in IBC Table 506.2. Allowable building height,
number of stories and area requirements for buildings with an accessory occupancy are to be based on
the main occupancy. For occupancies that do not meet the requirements to be accessory, they can be
separated by meeting the requirements of IBC Table 508.4 (see Table 23).
Table 23. Required separation of occupancies (IBC Table 508.4)

In the case of the Christopher Cohan Center, the occupancies are not separated except as required by
other areas of the code. In nonseparated occupancies, the building height, area, and number of stories
as well as the requirements of Chapter 9 are applied throughout the building based upon the most
restrictive occupancy.
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Other Separations
Although the occupancies in the building are not separated for height and area purposes, some
separations are required by other code sections.
•

•

•

•

Stage Requirements (IBC 410):
o Proscenium Wall (IBC 410.2.4): Since the stage is greater than 50 feet in height, the
stage must be separated from the seating area by a proscenium wall with a minimum 2hour fire-resistance rating. This requirement is met.
o Proscenium Curtain (IBC 410.2.5): Since a 2-hour proscenium curtain is required, the
stage opening must be protected with a proscenium curtain with a 2-hour fireresistance rating. This requirement is met.
o Dressing Rooms (IBC 410.4): The stage must be separated from dressing rooms, scene
docks and other accessory areas by a fire barrier with a minimum 2-hour fire-resistance
rating. Additionally, dressing rooms, scene docks, and other accessory areas must be
separated from each other by fire barriers with a minimum 1-hour fire-resistance rating.
The drawings’ general notes state that the separation from the stage to dressing rooms
is only required to be 1-hour rated, however the plans show a 2-hour fire barrier.
Therefore, this requirement is met.
Boiler Room (IBC Table 509): Boiler rooms with equipment exceeding 15 psi and 10 horsepower
are required to be provided with a 1-hour fire-resistance rated separation or be equipped with
automatic sprinklers. As the building is sprinklered, the fire-resistance rating is not required by
the 2018 IBC. However, the exception for sprinklers may be new, and the boiler rooms in the
Christopher Cohan Center are provided with a 1-hour fire-resistance rating.
Transformer Vault (IBC Table 509, NFPA 70-2017, Sections 450.8-450.48): Transformers are
required to be provided with varying levels of protection depending on the transformer size. The
size of the transformer is not known, although is expected to exceed 112 ½ kVA. NFPA 70
Section 450.21 requires a 1-hour fire resistant transformer room for transformers exceeding 112
½ kVA. For transformers exceeding 35,000 Volts, the transformer is required to be in a vault
with a 1-hour fire-resistance rating and an automatic sprinkler system. The transformer is
provided with a 1-hour fire-resistance rated dedicated space, therefore this requirement is
considered to be met.
Elevator Lobbies (IBC 3006.2): Elevator lobbies in the Christopher Cohan Center are not required
by the IBC as the building does not contain I occupancies, is not a high rise, and the building is
equipped with a fire sprinkler system. However, the elevator hoistways in the building are
equipped with opening protection in the form of elevator lobbies or fire-resistance rated doors.
This is likely because of the building being based on the California Building Code, which requires
hoistway opening protection in Section 3006.2 for Group A occupancies with elevators
connecting more than 2 stories.

Fire Resistance Plans
Plans showing the locations of fire resistance requirements throughout the building are located in
Appendix I. The plans do not show occupancy types as occupancy separation is not required in the
building. The plans were shown on architectural backgrounds as structural backgrounds do not show
most walls. Structural plans can be found in Appendix J for reference.
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Allowable Height, Area, and Stories
As stated in the previous section, the Christopher Cohan Center will be evaluated to the 2018 IBC as if
constructed with Type IB construction. The building’s main occupancy is A-1 with other occupancies
including A-3, B, and S-2. The occupancies are not separated and therefore the most restrictive
occupancy will be used to assess the building’s height, area, and stories requirements. The S-2 areas in
the building take up less than 10% of the building area and therefore will be considered an accessory
occupancy to the A-1 areas. For the building area calculation, S-2 is considered the most restrictive, but
since it is accessory to A-1, the allowable area will be based on A-1. Additionally, the building is
equipped with an automatic sprinkler system in accordance with NFPA 13 which allows for some
increases.
The allowable height and stories are based on IBC Section 504.
Table 24. Allowable number of stories (Partial IBC Table 504.4)

As seen in Table 24, six stories are allowed with A-1 occupancy and Type IB construction. The
Christopher Cohan Center is six stories, so this requirement is met.
Table 25. Allowable building height (Partial IBC Table 504.3)

The Christopher Cohan Center has an allowable building height of 180 feet, as shown in Table 25. The
building height is considered 55 feet tall, with a non-combustible roof structure that extends above this
height. Non-combustible roof structures are allowed to be unlimited in height when constructed with
materials consistent with the building type.
The allowable building area is specified by IBC Section 506 and shown in Table 26.
Table 26. Allowable building area (Partial IBC Table 506.2)

The allowable building area is unlimited for this occupancy classification and construction type;
therefore, this requirement is met.

Construction Materials
As the Christopher Cohan Center is considered Type IB construction, construction materials are all
required to be non-combustible, and all load-bearing components are required to have various levels of
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fire-resistive construction. This section of the report will focus on the fire-resistance requirements of
each type of component and analyze the materials used to meet the requirements.
Chapter 2 of the IBC describes the following components as part of the primary structural frame:
columns, structural members with direct connections to the columns (girders, beams, trusses, and
spandrels), members of floor and roof construction directly connected to the columns, and bracing
members essential to the vertical stability of the primary frame under gravity loads. The Christopher
Cohan Center is provided with a 2-hour rated primary structural frame according to the construction
documents.
Concrete Construction
Concrete is used in the slab on grade, footings, slab on metal deck, and in some walls and beams. The
structural concrete has a minimum compressive strength as follows:
•
•
•
•

Slab on grade: 2,000 PSI
Footings and on metal dec: 3,000 PSI
On sloped metal deck: 4,000 PSI
Walls, columns, beams, and slabs: 4,000 PSI

The cement used for structural concrete conforms with ASTM C-150 and aggregate used complies with
ASTM C-33. The structural concrete is reinforced with a 0.2 reinforcement percentage for slabs and 0.25
in the horizontal and 0.15 in the vertical direction for walls. The reinforcing bars comply with ASTM A615 and meet the following minimum coverage requirements:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Concrete poured against earth: 3”
Formed concrete exposed to earth or weather: 2”
Exterior face of walls: 2”
All other wall faces: 1”
Beams: 1½”
Slabs: ¾”
Columns: 1½”

Steel Construction
Structural steel is used for the columns and beams in the Christopher Cohan Center. All structural steel
conforms to ASTM A-36 and was erected in accordance with AISC specifications for design, fabrication,
and erection of structural steel for buildings. All structural steel connections have a minimum of two
bolts and high strength bolts were used for beam to column connections. The steel is required to have a
fire-resistive rating which is achieved with concrete or vermiculite fireproofing. The fireproofing covers
all flanges, splice plates, and webs with a minimum thickness of 2 inches.
Columns and Beams
Columns in the Christopher Cohan Center are primarily wide-flanged steel with the occasional use of
tubular steel in some locations. Beams and girders are constructed primarily of wide flange beams with
the occasional use of steel channels (limited to high roof construction for gridiron). Load is transferred
to columns primarily by wide flange steel girders. In areas requiring a long span for girders, intermediate
column support is provided by tube steel, with connections to wide flange steel at the ends of girders.
The open construction throughout the building requires a combination of unique loading scenarios, and
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there is not a specific typical layout of columns and beams. Since columns and beams are part of the
primary structural frame, they are required to have a fire-resistance rating of 2-hours which is provided
through concrete encasement or vermiculite fireproofing, as described in the previous section. Figures
44-46 show the column and beam fireproofing.

Figure 44. Steel wide flange column fireproofing.

Figure 45. Beam and floor/roof assembly fireproofing.

Figure 46. Steel tube fireproofing
Floor and Roof Assemblies
Floor assemblies in the Christopher Cohan Center are steel deck with reinforced concrete topping. The
steel deck is ASC Pacific or equivalent 18 GA. Concrete topping thickness ranges from 2 ½” to 3 ½”. The
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floor decks are supported by the wide flange steel beam and girder construction with 2-hour
fireproofing. The roof deck is made up of metal deck with roof insulation which is supported by steel
beams that are fireproofed with 2-hour fire resistance.
Exterior Walls
Exterior load bearing walls of the Christopher Cohan Center are comprised of 4-hour fire resistive
structure, which is achieved by the use of 10” CMU. Exterior non-load bearing walls are either noncombustible or 1-hour fire-resistive construction, depending on the fire separation distance to nearby
buildings. Figure 47 shows the exterior load-bearing wall construction. Walls that are non-bearing and
not required to have a fire-resistance rating are in some places curtain walls with glass, which can be
seen on the entry-side of the building which is primarily windows.

Figure 47. Photo of building exterior showing CMU walls with 4-hour fire resistance.
Interior Walls
Interior walls in the Christopher Cohan Center are required to have varying levels of fire-resistive
construction when they are load-bearing and/or are used for fire-resistive compartmentation. For
example, the stage is required to have 2-hour fire-separation from the seating areas and 1-hour
separation from accessory rooms. Additionally, rooms such as boiler rooms, transformer vaults, and
elevator lobbies are required to be 1-hour fire rated enclosures.
Interior walls with no fire-rating are primarily constructed of 1 layer of 5/8” gypsum board with 4” metal
studs. The gypsum board may be on one side or both sides of wall, depending on where the wall is
located. These walls do not typically extend to the floor deck and usually extend 6” above any acoustical
ceiling tiles. There are additional reinforcing concrete walls that are also not provided with a fire-rating.
Figure 48 shows one of the typical non-fire-rated wall assemblies.
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Figure 48. Typical non-fire-rated interior wall assembly.
There are a few locations in the Christopher Cohan center that require 1-hour fire-rated walls such as
corridors and boiler rooms. These walls are primarily made up of 1 layer of Type X gypsum board on
both sides, with 4” metal studs. These walls also extend the full floor height up to the structure in order
to meet the fire-resistance requirements. Figure 49 shows a typical 1-hour wall assembly for the
building.

Figure 49. Typical 1-hour fire-rated interior wall assembly.
Finally, load bearing walls and stage walls are required to have 2-hour fire-resistance ratings. These walls
have a similar composition to the 1-hour rated walls, but are provided with 2 layers of Type X gypsum
board in order to increase the fire-rating.
Openings and Penetrations
Openings and penetrations through fire-rated assemblies are required to be protected in order to
prevent the spread of fire through openings. Opening protection fire-resistance requirement is
dependent on the rating of the wall and the type of fire-resistive construction. For example, boiler
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rooms are provided with 1-hour construction and required to have 1-hour opening protection while
elevator lobbies with 1-hour construction are provided with 20-minute opening protection. Figure 50
shows the original construction documents’ description of the fire-resistance and opening protection
requirements.

Figure 50. Fire-resistance and opening protection for Christopher Cohan Center.
Where openings are doors, the doors will be fire-rated assemblies and will be self-closing. Duct
penetrations are provided with fire dampers or fire-smoke dampers where smoke opening protection is
required. Penetrations by pipe-tubing, ducts, etc. through rated assemblies are required to have fire
stopping to prevent unprotected openings in the assembly. Figure 51 and Figure 52 show the firestopping that is used at penetrations through fire-rated walls and floors.
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Figure 51. Typical firestopping at wall and floor penetration.

Figure 52. Typical firestopping at floor penetration.

Structural Fire Protection Analysis
Three design fires were selected in order to analyze the performance of the structural fire protection in
the building.
Design Fire 1: Lower Balcony Storage Room
The first design fire selected is in the Storage Room 307 on the lower balcony level near the stairs. The
use of the storage room is not known, so it will be assumed that various paper products and cleaning
materials may be stored in the room. This room was selected due to its size likely leading to flashover
and because it is one of the few storage rooms with exposed steel beams. The layout of the room is
shown in Figure 53.
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Figure 53. Architectural and structural plan of storage room 307.
The W10X12 beam is the beam that will be considered for this analysis. The loads for the beam are
determined by the original structural drawings, which is shown in Figure 54.

Figure 54. Design loads from original construction documents.
These design loads will be utilized for all load calculations. For the dead load on this beam, the weight of
the concrete floor deck was based on the ASC Floor Deck Catalog for normal weight concrete. Based on
a 3.5” slab thickness, the weight of the concrete slab and metal deck is estimated to be 39 psf. The dead
load for miscellaneous (7 psf) from the construction documents will be added to the deck weight and
the self-weight of the beam to determine the total dead load. The tributary area was calculated to be 8
feet, therefore the dead load is as follows (EQ1):
46

8

12

380

The vertical live load will be 100 psf for a typical floor from the construction documents, which
corresponds with 800 pounds per linear foot. Using a factored load of 1.2D+0.5L (ASCE/SEI 7-10), the
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factored distributed load is 856 pounds per linear foot. The moment was calculated assuming a simply
supported beam with uniform distributed load, using the following equation (EQ2):
8

856 pounds/linear foot
15.5 feet

Using this equation, the moment was calculated to be 26 kip-ft. The design condition for failure is as
follows (EQ3):
>∅

Where:

Applied moment, calculated as 26 kip-ft

∅

1 during fire

! "

(EQ4)

Where:

"#

12.6 in3 for W10X12 beam (AISC Beam Properties)

The yield strength of steel is dependent on the steel temperature. The yield strength of the beam will be
taken as a function of the steel temperature with time as calculated in the previous equations for
protected and unprotected steel. The SFPE Handbook 5th edition provides the following piecewise
function for the yield strength of steel based on temperature (EQ5):
Up to 600 °C:
600 °C and up:
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The calculated moment using these equations must be divided by 12 to convert to kip-ft.
Next, the heat transfer boundary conditions were calculated for the steel beam. Since the steel beam is
thermally thin, the steel is assumed to be at a constant temperature throughout at any given time. For
unprotected steel, the steel temperature at the next time step is as follows (EQ6):
!789:

;7 ∆
<7 7 >

∆ = time step, seconds
7=

7

?ℎA B!C8 − !78 E

Steel density, 7,850 kg/m3

> 7 =Steel specific heat, 460 J/kgK
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ℎA = 20 W/m2K
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(EQ7)

For W10X12 beam from AISC Beam Properties:
KC

3.960 inches

L

9.87 inches

M

0.19 inches
3.5 in2

Since the beam is protected with spray applied fire protection, the beam temperature will also be
calculated for a protected case (EQ8):
!
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Using previous values for steel and:
NO

0.12 W/mK

O

300 kg/m3

LO

>

25 mm
O

1200 J/kgK

This design fire will use the time equivalency method to calculate the gas temperatures. The following
shows the equation for calculating the equivalent time (EQ9):

C=

R

Floor area, 79 ft2=7.3 m2

C =Fuel

SA T

U

C C
8

−

U

load, 500 MJ/m2

SA =Heat of combustion, 17.1 MJ/kg (Table A.39 of SFPE Handbook 5th edition, red oak)
U =Area of vertical openings, door assumed
8 =Total
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Using this equation and values, the equivalent time was calculated as 17.2 minutes. Using these
equations, the temperatures of the steel were calculated throughout time and the results are shown in
Figure 55.

Figure 55. Protected and Unprotected steel temperatures for equivalent time method.
Finally, the moments were calculated, and the results are shown in Figure 56.

Figure 56. Protected and unprotected steel moment capability compared to applied load.
As shown in Figure 56, the protected steel will remain at a low enough temperature to resist the applied
load over the full burn time. However, the unprotected steel failed at approximately 7 minutes.
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Design Fire 2: Upper Balcony Storage Room
The second design fire selected was in the Storage Room 416 on the Upper Balcony Level. This room was
selected due to it’s proximity to the exit stair and because it was one of the other storage rooms with a
beam running directly through it. The layout of the room is shown in Figure 57.

Figure 57. Design fire 2 location.
The W10X12 beam is the beam that will be considered for this analysis. The tributary area for this beam
was calculated to be approximately 10 feet and the beam length is 12.5 feet. The design loads from the
construction documents are the same as used in Design Fire 1 and can be found in Figure 54. The dead
load was calculated as follows:
L

46

10

12

472

The vertical live load will be 100 psf for a typical floor from the construction documents, which
corresponds with 1 kip per linear foot. Using a factored load of 1.2D+0.5L (ASCE/SEI 7-10), the factored
distributed load is 1066 pounds per linear foot. The moment was calculated to 20.8 kip-ft assuming a
simply supported beam with uniform distributed load and using the following equation EQ2 as described
previously. The moment capacity of the beam and thermal boundary condition equations are the same
since as Design Fire 1 since the beam sizes are the same. For Design Fire 2, however, the Margaret Law
Design Method will be used instead of the equivalent time method. The first part of this analysis uses
the Thomas plot. The Thomas plot is based on opening factor, which is calculated as follows:
%

W TSW

Where:
%

W

SW

Area of walls and ceiling minus open area, 596 ft2
Area of opening, 3X7 ft door, 21 ft2
Height of opening, 7 ft

This corresponds with an opening factor of 10.7, which is just on the edge of Regime I and Regime II.
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Figure 58. Thomas plot for maximum compartment temperature.
As shown in Figure 58, the maximum compartment temperature is approximately 1000 °C. The time to
burnout must also be calculated. The time to burnout is calculated using the following equation:
XY

Where:

Z

And

0.1

C

Z

W TSW

Mass of fuel
The fuel load for the storage room was determined from “Medium-Scale Fire Experiments of
Commercial Properties” from the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Carlton
University. Researchers performed survey work for various commercial spaces and found that the mean
fire load density for storage areas was 1,196 MJ/m2. The floor area of the storage room is 9.6 meters,
which corresponds with a fuel load of 11,500 MJ. Utilizing a heat of combustion of 17.1 MJ/kg (Table
A.39 of SFPE Handbook 5th edition, red oak), the fuel load can be approximated to be 672 kg. Based on
the inputs as described, the burning rate is 0.28 kg/s, which leads to a burnout time of 39 minutes. With
a 10 °C per minute cooling, the room is expected to return to ambient temperatures after 137 minutes.
With the previously stated inputs and heat transfer model, the steel in both the protected and
unprotected cases are expected to fail, as seen in Figure 59.
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Figure 59. Protected and unprotected steel moment capability compared to applied load.
The unprotected steel fails almost immediately at approximately 35 seconds, while the protected steel
failed much later at around 45 minutes. This calculation is likely very conservative for the amount of fuel
present in the room, and also does not consider the effect of sprinklers on both the fire growth and
temperatures within the compartment.

Structural Fire Protection Conclusion
The above sections analyzed the structural fire protection of the Christopher Cohan Center from both a
prescriptive and a performance standpoint. The building was constructed with Type II Fire-Resistive
construction, which has similar requirements to the 2018 IBC Type IB classification. Walls, floors, roofs,
and the primary structural frame were all found to meet the requirements of the construction type. The
building height and area were also considered acceptable based on current codes. From the
performance-based perspective, the building may be considered to not be meeting the requirements set
forth based on the second design fire. The steel beam is expected to fail under this “worst-case” fire
condition. However, the building structure is much more complicated than just a single member, and it
is possible that this localized failure would not cause significant damage to the structure. More
consideration could be given to whether the fire would be contained to the room of origin, as spread
outside the room may lead to further damage to other members and a more catastrophic outcome.

Stage Requirements
IBC Section 410 outlines the requirements for stages, including requirements relating to the
construction. The stage must be constructed of materials required for floors of the corresponding
construction type of the building, except for stages constructed of wood or approved noncombustible
materials. The stage floor at the Christopher Cohan Center is constructed of wood with concrete
masonry walls therefore this requirement is met.
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The IBC also regulates the construction of production areas such as galleries, gridirons, and catwalks.
Beams designed to attach theater equipment, gridirons, and catwalks must be constructed of approved
materials consistent with the construction type (i.e. noncombustible for Type I) but are not required to
be fire rated. Floors of catwalks and fly galleries are allowed to be constructed of any material. The
catwalk, gridiron, and ceiling support of the Christopher Cohan Center are constructed of steel beams or
channels and meet these requirements.
Stages that exceed 50 feet in height are required to be separated from seating areas by a proscenium
wall with a 2-hour rating. The stage height is defined by IBC Section 410.2.1.1 to be “measured from the
lowest point on the stage floor to the highest point of the roof or floor deck above the stage” [2]. This
height extends to the highest horizontal assembly that encloses the stage, which is the roof in this case.
The total height of the Christopher Cohan Center is approximately 80 feet, so a proscenium wall is
required. The opening of the proscenium wall is required to be provided with a proscenium curtain
meeting the requirements of NFPA 80, horizontal sliding doors complying with Section 716, an approved
water curtain in accordance with Section 903.3.1.1, a smoke control system in accordance with Section
909, or natural ventilation maintaining the smoke level not less than 6 feet above the floor of means of
egress. The Christopher Cohan Center has a 2-hour rated proscenium wall with the opening protected
by an automatic closing proscenium curtain.
The IBC also regulates the type of combustibles that can be used in sets and scenery. All combustible
materials used in sets must comply with NFPA 701. Additionally, foam plastics must comply with Section
2603 of the IBC and the International Fire Code (IFC). Since sets change from show to show, this
requirement is part of the administrative controls that the Christopher Cohan Center should have in
place.
The IBC requires stages to be equipped with roof vents. The vents must be activated with heat-activated
devices (such as fusible links) and must cover at least 5% of the stage floor area. The vents also need to
have a manual method of opening. Figure 60 shows the roof vents at the Christopher Cohan Center
which meet the requirements as described in IBC Section 410.2.7.1.
While occupancy separation was not required for the Christopher Cohan Center, IBC Chapter 4 requires
a 2-hour fire barrier separation between stage and dressing rooms, and a 1-hour barrier between
dressing room units.
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Figure 60. Christopher Cohan Center roof vents.

Performance-Based Analysis
The following sections will outline the performance-based analysis of the Christopher Cohan Center.
While prescriptive-based design is intended to provide safety to the building occupants, it is considered
“implicit” safety that does not directly quantify a safety factor. The performance-based analysis is
intended to assess an “explicit” factor of safety for the building. In the performance-based scenarios,
egress times will be evaluated in comparison to the time where areas of the building become unsafe for
habitation.
The method used to assess the required performance-based analysis will be based on Method 1 from
the NFPA 101 Annex Section A.5.2.2, which is described as follows: “The design team can set detailed
performance criteria that ensure that occupants are not incapacitated by fire effects.” [3]. The
performance criteria will determine the time to untenable conditions, which will be considered the
available safe egress time (ASET). NFPA 101 refers the designer to the SFPE Engineering Guide to
Performance-Based Fire Protection to establish tenability limits. The development of tenability criteria
will be described in a later section of this report.

Required Safe Egress Time (RSET)
In order to assess the building performance, criteria must be specified to evaluate upon. To provide
explicit life safety for occupants, the available safe egress time for a building must be greater than the
required safe egress time (with an acceptable factor of safety). Figure 61 shows an overview of the
factors that make of the required safe egress time.
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Figure 61. Visual representation of the RSET vs. ASET goal and components that make up RSET. [4]
Components of RSET are influenced by the building conditions such as the fire alarm system, the
administrative controls, and the means of egress. The detection time and movement time will be
covered in later sections of this report by the egress and fire dynamics simulator (FDS) models. The
alarm time is the time that it takes from detection for the alarm to sound and notify occupants. NFPA 72
Section 10.11.1 states that “Actuation of alarm notification appliances or emergency voice
communications…shall occur within 10 seconds after the activation of an initiating device” [5].
Therefore, the assumed worst case alarm time is 10 seconds.
Pre-movement is a relatively complicated component to assess, due to the dependence on occupants to
recognize and respond to an alarm. Ideally, occupants would hear the alarm and immediately begin
following direction and exiting calmly, but occupants go through a period to recognize the signal and act
upon it. The SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire explores the process of sensing the cue(s) of fire,
paying attention to the cue(s), comprehending the cue(s), processing the cue(s), and ultimately taking
protective action. The guide also analyses the effects of the fire environment, the building
characteristics, and people on these steps. Table 27 summarizes some of the main take aways from this
section of the guide.
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Table 27. Factors influencing the sensing of emergency cues. [6]
Fire Environment

Sensing the cue

Comprehending the cue

Processing the Cue

Decision making

Building Characteristics
Building alarm system, the
Olfactory such as smells of
type of audible alarm system,
burning or smoke, visual, auditory
audibility and visibility of
such as crackling sounds, heat
alarm cues

People
Cues of other people, hearing or
visual impairments preventing ability
to sense cue, commitment to preemergency activities

Ability to comprehend fire cues
will depend on knowledge and
past experience with fires, even
in non-emergency situations (i.e.
bonfire)

The language used in the warning will
influence ability to comprehend,
occupant characteristics such as age,
non-native language speaker, and
cognitive impairments can also
influence comprehension

Training and prior alarms allow
staff or common occupants to
have been trained to recognize
alarm signals

Likelihood that a warning
signal will be interpreted as a
Larger number or intensity of fire
real event can depend on
cues may indicate quicker the
credibility. Credibility can be
level of danger and need for
increased with additional
response
warning details or reduced by
false alarms
Products of combustion can
Exits that are easy to see,
influence ability to make
understand, and use are
decisions, occupants may not
helpful to make occupants
choose to want to evacuate
decide to use them
through smoke if present

Likelihood of finding credibility in
other's cues depends on the person's
credibility, unusual activity such as
moving towards exits by large groups
of people can influence other's to
perceive the threat
Actions of other's influence
individuals, if others are not taking
action an individual may choose to
follow suit and stay in place

In the Christopher Cohan Center, an example of a factor that may affect the processing of a cue from
others is the use of crowd managers and their perceived credibility. If the crowd managers are perceived
as credible from the occupants, they may be able to get the occupants to recognize that there is a fire
and believe they need to move. However, a fire that starts in a different area than where occupants are
might not create any visible or olfactory signals initially for the occupants which could increase their premovement time. In order to further understand the premovement time, the occupants were classified
according to another set of criteria offered in Part 1 of the Guide to Human Behavior. This can be found
in Table 28.
Table 28. Occupant characteristics influencing pre-movement time

Characteristic
Familiarity
Affiliations
Disabilities
Alertness
Age
Role

Staff

Other Occupants
Familiar
Not familiar
Individuals, co-workers Individuals, families, friends
Likely not disabled
Wide range possible
Awake, not inebriated Awake, potentially intoxicated
Adults
Children, adults, elderly
Lead others
May expect guidance

Staff at the Christopher Cohan Center will tend to be awake, familiar with the building, sober, and
trained to lead others. On the other hand, occupants could represent a wide variety of scenarios where
some may lead others, but others may be disabled or intoxicated and need assistance perceiving the
danger or finding their way.
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After defining some of the factors that affect the pre-movement time, the time needs to be quantified.
“The Variation of Pre-movement Time in Building Evacuation” used forty unannounced evacuation
experiments in six occupancies with different alarm types to attempt to quantify pre-movement times.
The report analyzed evacuation experiments in theatre occupancies, which were classified as “cinemas”
for the report but should represent similar situations to that of the Christopher Cohan Center. Table 29
shows the total observed pre-movement times for each occupancy.
Table 29. Observed total premovement times by occupancy (Table 6 in [7])

Average pre-movement times for the cinema occupancies ranged from 30 and 44 seconds, but in some
cases were up to 224 seconds. Additionally, voice alarms had the longest pre-movement time among
the three types. The report provides a histogram and fitted probability distribution of pre-movement
times (shown in Figure 62) for the cinema occupancy with voice alarm, which can help to see how
common the larger pre-movement times are.

Figure 62. Probability distribution/histogram of observed pre-movement times in cinema occupancies
with a voice alarm (Figure 9 in [7]).
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This figure shows that most premovement times are not greater than about 60 seconds.
The SFPE Handbook Chapter 64 also provides some data for pre-movement time. Table 64.11 in the
SFPE Handbook references two experiments with a theater or cinema occupancy where the premovement time ranged from 8 to 36 seconds [8]. Based on the data from SFPE and the Fire Technology
study on movement times, 60 seconds will be used to provide a conservative but reasonable estimate of
pre-movement time.

Tenability Criteria
The focus of this performance-based analysis will be based on life safety for the occupants, so the
performance criteria for the analysis will be the tenability criteria. In some cases, engineers may define
other criteria to prevent damage to the property but that will not be evaluated in this report. Tenability
criteria is used to determine the time where a building or area is no longer habitable for longer than a
specified period for occupants. Tenability criteria is often grouped into the following categories:
visibility, toxicity, heat flux, and temperature.
As with pre-movement time, the characteristics of occupants can affect tenability criteria. For example,
toxicity is usually quantified with Fractional Effective Dose (FED) which measures the additive effects of
toxic products of combustion. A FED value of 1 would be associated with “sublethal effects that would
incapacitate persons of average susceptibility.” [9]. At a FED value of 0.3, 11.4% of the population would
be susceptible to incapacitation compared to the 50% for an FED of 1. Subsets of the population tend to
be more susceptible to gas toxicants than others. Some examples of these groups are the very young,
the elderly and those with compromised respiratory systems. While the Christopher Cohan Center is
located on a college campus, members of the community also frequent shows meaning that any variety
of occupants could be present depending on the occasion. Therefore, it should be accounted for that
some occupants will be more sensitive to the toxicants than others. For this reason, a FED of 0.3 will be
used for toxicity.
For the purposes of this analysis, toxicity and the fractional effective dose will be simplified. The
fractional effective does typically accounts for the additive effects of the asphyxiants carbon monoxide
(CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN), in combination with increased breathing rates associated with raised
carbon dioxide levels. However, it is difficult to quantify hydrogen cyanide production as it is a product
of incomplete combustion and information was not readily available in the sources used for the design
fires. Additionally, considering the effect on breathing rate is difficult due to the already unknown
physical ability and strain on each occupant at each point in time. As such, and to prevent unnecessary
computational difficulty, the toxicity effects will be solely based on carbon monoxide effects. The
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) released an informational report in which they quantified
the average CO concentration associated with an FED of 0.3 for an exposure time of 10 minutes to be
683 ppm. [10]. This calculation assumes a constant exposure concentration which is not likely to occur,
so the tenability cutoff will be considered where the concentration first reaches 683 ppm.
The same informational report provides tenability criteria for temperature and heat flux. The report
created a fractional effective dose for heat flux, which combines the effects of radiative and convective
heat. At a temperature of 60°C, the FED of 0.3 would be met in 10 minutes, therefore 60°C will be used
as the cutoff temperature for tenability. For heat flux, 2.5 kW/m2 is often used as it corresponds with the
ability to be exposed for greater than 30 minutes without skin burning. However, a 10-minute exposure
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time is more appropriate for the egress times in the Christopher Cohan Center, which corresponds to a
heat flux of 5.75 kW/m2.
Visibility is the final tenability criteria that will be assessed. While a lack of visibility does not directly
lead to death, occupants will be unable to find an exit path and may succumb to the other effects before
the conditions improve or they can be rescued. Chapter 61 of the SFPE Handbook discusses visibility in
smoke. Table 61.3 recommends 13 meters of visibility for unfamiliar occupants and 4 meters for familiar
[8]. The Christopher Cohan Center will have some staff who are familiar, but most of the occupants will
be unfamiliar with the building. Therefore, the cutoff for tenability will be 13 meters.
Table 30 provides a summary of the criteria that will be used for the analysis.
Table 30. Summary of tenability criteria

Criteria
Value (units)
Toxicity (CO Concentration) 683 (ppm)
Heat Flux
5.75 (kW/m2)
Temperature
60 (°C)
Visibility
13 (meters)

Design Fires
Three design fires will be discussed in this section of the report, with one selected for further analysis.
The design fires were selected according to the recommendations of NFPA 101 Section 5.5.3.
The first design fire was specified to model the Design Fire Scenario 2 specified in NFPA 101, described
as follows:
(1) It is an ultrafast-developing fire, in the primary means of egress, with interior doors open at
the start of the fire.
(2) It addresses the concern regarding a reduction in the number of available means of egress.
The design fire was placed at the main entrance as this is the primary means of egress and may also
have combustible items present on a regular basis. This location will be challenging for the evacuation of
the main hall, since the occupants are unfamiliar and will tend to exit through the same route they
entered. Additional exits are present throughout the building, but they will have a much higher load
than typical and could significantly impact the egress time.
To determine the potential fuel sources, common uses of the Christopher Cohan Center were
considered. The building is mainly used for shows in the main hall but can also be used for events like
club fairs. For a club fair, there may be tables, chairs, and displays spread throughout the lobby space.
For shows, the lobby space may be mostly empty, or decorated to match the show with props and
furniture items. Items such as decorations or chairs and tables may be made of combustibles like wood
or plastic and in combination could create a large fire. Alternatively, one large object could a single fuel
source, like a large Christmas tree.
Since the fuel load of this area changes on a regular basis, an ultrafast fire was chosen to model a worstcase scenario. An ultrafast fire has a very steep growth rate which could result from a fire with stacked
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plastic chairs or upholstered furniture. The lobby space is not expected to have fuel loads to support this
intense of a fire on a regular basis but could from time to time. The fire is to be located near the center
of the lobby below a floor opening. This location was chosen as it will block some of the main exit doors,
and fire suppression will be delayed as the first sprinklers to activate may be on the floor above.
Depending on when the fire occurs, the fire could go unnoticed until the sprinklers activate, allowing for
a large fire to build up and threaten tenability on both the lobby level and the level above. Due to time
constraints, this design fire will not be assessed in further detail.
The other design fires were specified to model the Design Fire Scenario 9 in NFPA 101, described as
follows:
(1) It is a fire originating in ordinary combustibles in a room or area with each passive or active
fire protection system independently rendered ineffective.
(2) It addresses concerns regarding the unreliability or unavailability of each fire protection
system or fire protection feature, considered individually.
For these design fires, fires located on the stage were chosen. The proscenium curtain located at the
stage opening will fail to close during the fire, which will allow smoke to spread to the assembly seating
area. The sprinklers are also assumed to fail to control the fire based on the long time to activation. The
sprinkler activation time was estimated using the Zukoski and Heskestad plume correlations. The
Heskestad correlation predicted sprinkler activation at 15.7 MW while the Zukoski correlation showed
that the sprinkler would not activate during the first 900 seconds. This is shown in Figure 63. At these
high heat release rates, it is not known whether the sprinklers will control the fire and it is also unlikely
that occupants in the theater would not have already noticed the fire and been able to evacuate the
building.

Figure 63. Sprinkler activation times
The stage location was chosen since it is the most likely area to have a large fuel load that would expose
the occupants in the main hall to a fire.
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The data for these design fires was based on the “Fire Safety in Theatres – A New Design Approach”
study conducted by Ove Arup and Partners PC at the request of NFPA Technical Committee on Fire
Doors and Windows, and The Fire Protection Research Foundation. The report analyzed three fire
scenarios in three different sized theaters (with the largest being most similar in size to the Christopher
Cohan Center), as summarized in Table 31. These scenarios were based on a survey of theater
professionals on where typical ignition sources would be located.
Table 31. Fire scenarios for Arup study [11].

The report also included findings on the typical materials used in stage scenery, shown in Table 32.
Table 32. Typical materials used in scenery (Table 2 in [11]).

The typical materials were concluded to have a makeup of about 75% natural and 25% synthetic
materials. By averaging the fuel properties for the various materials, the following values were used in
the models:
•
•
•

Heat of combustion: 15.63 [MJ/kg]
Soot yield: 0.0356 [kg/kg]
Carbon monoxide yield: 0.21 [kg/kg]
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Radiative fraction: 0.35

These fuel properties will be used for the design fires in this report. For the fire heat release rate, the
study used a constant density of 500 kW/m2 while modeling a radially spreading fire with a fast growth
rate. For this report, the heat release rate will be simplified to an uncontrolled, fast t-squared growth
rate fire over a constant area. This should still create a similarly challenging fire to the Arup report while
simplifying the modeling process.
The study done by Arup found that the fire at the center of the stage at floor level was the most
challenging to the life safety of the auditorium occupants. The fire at the center of the stage resulted in
delayed or total lack of response from ceiling level fire protection devices, and smoke spread relatively
quickly to the auditorium. In the other fire locations, ceiling devices operated more rapidly, and smoke
spread to the occupants later. Some other key findings from the report are as follows:
•
•
•
•

A fire at the floor level develops a “cool” and Deep smoke layer. Devices activate relatively late
and smoke spills relatively early into seating area.
Fires in the riggings develop a hot and shallow smoke layer with quick device activation.
“Ultra-fast” rate-of-rise heat detectors activate prior to any other devices that were evaluated.
The fire safety curtain would not likely be triggered by fusible links along the release line
because of slow thermal response.

Since the construction documents for the Christopher Cohan Center don’t mention an automatic means
for deploying the fire curtain and fusible links are unlikely to release, the model will assume the curtain
does not close. The fire scenario in the center of the stage will be further analyzed, with a potential to
assess one of the other fire locations if time is permitting.

Pathfinder Model
A Pathfinder model was used to estimate the movement time contribution to the egress time. The
Pathfinder model only accounted for the occupants in the main hall and on the stage. Occupant loads
were based on the calculations from the Occupant Loads section in the prescriptive-based analysis. The
occupants were able to use all exits from the main hall since for the chosen design fire none of the exits
were blocked by the fire. Figure 64 shows the initial Pathfinder model, with all performers on stage and
occupants at their seats.
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Figure 64. Pathfinder model with occupants in their initial positions
Pathfinder has two modes for simulating movement. The following section from the Pathfinder User
Guide describes these modes: “In "Steering" mode, occupants use a steering system to move and
interact with others. This mode tries to emulate human behavior and movement as much as possible.
SFPE mode uses a set of assumptions and hand-calculations as defined in the Engineering Guide to
Human Behavior in Fire (SFPE 2019). In SFPE mode, occupants make no attempt to avoid one another
and can interpenetrate, but doors impose a flow limit and velocity is controlled by density.” The
Pathfinder model was ran using the steering mode for this report.
Since the smoke level will descend from the roof, the occupants in the balconies may be most subjected
to untenable conditions due to visibility, toxicity, and temperature. However, the balconies have less
occupants and may be able to leave quicker than occupants lower in the orchestra area. Therefore,
egress times are reported in Table 33 for each area of occupants in correspondence with the occupant
colors in Figure 64.
Table 33. Movement time summary.
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As shown above, the egress times for the balconies and stage area ranged from one to two minutes
while the orchestra area would take closer to 4 minutes to evacuate.

Fire Dynamics Simulator Model
The selected design fires will be modeled using the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) which was created by
the National Institute for Standards and Testing (NIST). FDS is a computational fluid dynamics model
(CFD) used to calculate fire-driven fluid flow. The FDS model was created by specifying a mesh
appropriate for the fire scenario, creating the fire area using components such as obstructions and
vents, and creating a fire burner that matched the selected design fire scenario. The following sections
will further describe the FDS model and the results.

Mesh Resolution
Mesh resolution is an important characteristic of an FDS model that can influence the accuracy of the
results. Calculations are performed at nodes along boundaries of each grid in the mesh. Increased mesh
resolution creates a more precise model but can also drastically increase computational time. Therefore,
a balance should be found to avoid spending unnecessary computational power on the model. Some
forms of estimating appropriate mesh resolution are a sensitivity analysis for components such as
sprinklers or fusible links or a non-dimensional analysis. For this report, a non-dimensional analysis was
performed in order to save modeling time. The FDS User Guide specifies the following equation to
calculate a non-dimensional characteristic fire diameter [12]:
[∗
Where,

^_ = Heat release rate [kW]

]

^_

`a >b !a Tc

d

/f

`a = Ambient density of air, 1.204 [kg/m3]
>b = Specific heat of air, 1 [kJ/kg*K]

!a = Ambient temperature of air, 293 [K]

c= Gravity, 9.81 [m/s2]

Once D* is calculated, it will be divided by the mesh size (dx) to give a non-dimensional measurement of
mesh resolution. Typically, a value of 10 for [ ∗ /L# is used, however the FDS User Guide does not
recommend an “acceptable” minimum and instead refers the user to the Validation Guide which
provides a table of [ ∗ /L# used in the validation models. This table ranges in values from 2-118, but
most values hover closer to the area of 5-15. Additionally, since the heat release rate varies with time,
so does the value of [ ∗. Therefore, the mesh resolution will be considered at times of 30 seconds, 100
seconds, 300 seconds, and the maximum modeled time of 600 seconds. Table 34 shows the results of
for [ ∗ /L# for these scenarios.
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Table 34. Mesh Resolution by mesh size and model time.
Time

HRR (kW)

D*

30

42

0.27

100

469

0.71

300

4221

1.71

600

16884

2.98

Mesh Size, dx (m)
0.125
0.25
0.5
0.125
0.25
0.5
0.125
0.25
0.5
0.125
0.25
0.5

D*/dx
2.17
1.08
0.54
5.68
2.84
1.42
13.67
6.84
3.42
23.81
11.90
5.95

As shown, a smaller mesh size results in a larger [ ∗ /L#. For the 30 second calculation, only the 0.125meter mesh size resulted in a value that falls within the range of values provided in the Validation Guide.
However, for the other times simulated, all provided values within the ranges found in the Validation
Guide. Since the heat release rate at 30 seconds is so small, and the modeled space is rather large it will
be assumed for this report that the mesh size of 0.25-meters would still provide accurate results over
the whole timeframe. Using a 0.125-meter mesh would significantly increase computational time over
the 0.25-meter mesh, so it was selected to proceed. With a 0.25-meter mesh, the computational time to
run one model is approximately 3 days.

PyroSim Modeling
The fire dynamics simulator model for this project was built using Pyrosim, which is a graphical interface
for FDS made by Thunderhead Engineering software. Only the stage and main hall area were modeled
since the selected design fire was in this location and to limit the model size. The overall model is shown
in Figure 65.
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Figure 65. Modeling environment and computational meshes.
The walls of the model were assumed to be inert, which will cause the walls to remain at a constant
temperature. This assumption will slow the detection of devices near the walls, but since the model is so
large it was assumed that inert walls would not cause a large difference in other aspects of the model.
The doors to the main hall and at the stage were modeled as open to provide makeup air for the fire.
Detection for the model was determined to be provided by the sprinklers at the ceiling level, due to the
Arup study showing that these sprinklers would activate first unless gridiron level sprinklers had a much
quicker RTI or lower activation temperature, which was not the case for this building. The sprinklers
were specified to be standard response, 200°F in the sprinkler drawings. For the model, the sprinklers
were 93°C with an RTI of 100 (ms)1/2. The sprinkler layout was determined from the sprinkler as-built
drawings and the sprinklers were located one grid below the ceiling, which corresponds to 0.25 meters
(10 inches) and should be representative of the installation of the sprinklers. The layout is shown in
Figure 66.
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Figure 66. Sprinkler layout above stage.
One key part of the model is the location and activation of the smoke vents located on the roof stage.
Unfortunately, only the layout of the roof vents was known for the Christopher Cohan Center, so the RTI
and activation temperature were assumed based on research and best judgement. The National Fire
Protection Research Foundation funded a research project conducted at Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL)
to study the interaction of sprinklers, roof vents, and draft curtains typically found in warehouses and
manufacturing facilities. This study used a bulk RTI value for roof vents ranging from 167 to 180 (ms)1/2
but did find some delay (approximately 30 seconds) in fusing of the link on the roof vents even once the
temperature was reached. Based on these results, the fusible link for the vents will have an RTI of 180
(ms)1/2 with a 30 second delay for the vents to open once the activation temperature is reached. The
activation temperature was based upon research of activation temperature offerings from various
manufacturers. Most manufacturers offered a range of activation temperatures, while some offered
only a standard 165°F activation. Since the smoke is expected to be relatively cool (based on the Arup
study analysis), the 165°F activation was selected to offer a chance to vent the smoke before it can harm
occupants. FDS allows for control using various detectors, and a heat detector with matching RTI and
temperature values was selected to model the fusible link for each roof vent. Figure 67 shows the input
used for the “fusible links” in the FDS model.
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Figure 67. Heat detector input used to model fusible link.
The smoke vents were modeled as obstructions that would be removed when activated by control logic.
The control logic is as follows in Figure 68.

Figure 68. Control logic for smoke vents
Finally, the smoke vents were laid out according to the drawings, with heat detectors located at the
center of each vent for activation. This is shown in Figure 69.

93 | P a g e

Christopher Cohan Center

Cal Poly Fire Protection Engineering

Figure 69. Vent layout with heat detectors for activation.
As discussed in the design fire section of this report, a fire located at the center of the stage opening was
selected as the main fire situation to be modeled. The fire characteristics are summarized in Table 35.
Table 35. Fire input values.

Input
Size
Growth Rate
Heat of Combustion
Soot yield
CO yield
Radiative fraction

Value
3m X 3m
Fast t-squared (0.047 kW/s^2)
15.6 [MJ/kg]
0.036 [kg/kg]
0.21 [kg/kg]
0.35

No suppression was modeled as previously discussed, so the fire was allowed to grow for the full
duration of the modeling time. The fire was located in the center of the stage, towards the front, in
order to provide the highest radiation levels to the occupants while modeling the worst-case fire for life
safety (per the Arup study results). The fire was located as shown in Figure 70.
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Figure 70. Location of fire.
Aside from the heat detectors and sprinklers described previously, several slice files were utilized to
provide output data for the model. Since the egress time was calculated at each of the seating levels,
slice files were placed 2 meters above each seating level to gather data at the expected head level of the
occupants. The balconies were located at 13, 10, and 4 meters in the egress model, so slice files were
located at 15, 12 and 6 meters. Additional slice files were also located at 2 meters to represent the head
height of the occupants in the orchestra area, even though some would be located higher. Slice files
were created for temperature, visibility, and carbon monoxide concentrations. Additionally, to track the
temperatures and velocities at the ceiling to compare with heat detector (‘fusible link’) and sprinkler
activation times, slice files were located at 0.25 meters below the roof.

Results
The model was run for a total of 700 seconds to allow for enough time to simulate the full egress time of
the occupants. It was expected that there may be issues with detecting the smoke through automatic
means, since only sprinklers were present for detection at the stage, and they were located
approximately 90 feet above the stage. Figure 71 shows the calculated sprinkler times using the Zukoski
and Heskestad plume correlations compared to the sprinkler activation time output from FDS. The
correlations follow the FDS results closely at the beginning, but as the fire grows the FDS sprinkler heats
up faster than with the modeled correlations. Still, none of the simulations had a sprinkler detection
time that occurred before a very large fire had developed. Therefore, the assumption that sprinklers
would not control the fire likely would hold true. Additionally, the detection time should be based on
the sprinkler activation time, but it does not seem likely that occupants would watch a fire grow to this
size before beginning to evacuate. It was decided to move forward with the analysis and find times to
loss of tenability to find whether it was likely that the occupants could egress before the fire reached
untenable conditions even without being notified.
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Figure 71. Sprinkler activation times using varying correlations compared to FDS results.
The FDS model calculated that smoke would begin to spread to the seats at about 200 seconds. When
the first smoke vent opened at approximately 435 seconds, smoke had descended to the second balcony
level. By 495 seconds, all vents had opened and from this point the smoke level slowly starts to rise
again, showing that occupants below the highest balcony levels would not face large amounts of smoke.
At the end of the modeling time (700 seconds), even though the fire had grown substantially, the smoke
level is much thinner in the seating area than it was at the time of vent activation, showing that the
vents were successful in reducing the smoke descension. The FDS results are shown at these times in
Figures 72-75.

Figure 72. FDS smoke spread at 200 seconds.
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Figure 73. FDS smoke spread at 435 seconds, when first roof vent activated.

Figure 74. FDS smoke spread at 495 seconds, when all roof vents have activated.
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Figure 75. FDS smoke spread at 700 seconds, the end of the modeled time.
The three tenability criteria that were assessed in the FDS model were temperature, visibility and
toxicity. The slice file outputs at the highest balcony level were assessed first to determine the time to
untenable conditions, since the smoke spread showed that it was unlikely that other occupants would
be affected.
The tenability due to toxicity was assessed first. The carbon monoxide mass fraction was evaluated at
the slice file 2 meters above the highest balcony, with the highest mass fraction occurring at
approximately 465 seconds, between the time of the first and last roof vents opening. The mass
fractions in the seating area were on the order of 1X10-5 kg/kg while the tenability cutoff is 6.8X10-4.
Therefore, the carbon monoxide levels are more than an order of magnitude less than the tenability
cutoff and occupants are not expected to succumb to the effects of toxicity. The slice file results are
shown at 465 seconds in Figure 76. The carbon monoxide fractions were checked at the lower balcony
and were also much lower than the tenability criteria.
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Figure 76. Carbon monoxide mass fraction at the upper balcony at 465 seconds.
The temperatures were also assessed at the upper balcony to determine the threat to occupants. Again,
the highest temperatures were reached during the time that the vents were opening, at 460 seconds.
The temperature near seating areas at this time did not exceed 50°C. Since the tenability cutoff was
60°C, this level was also not met. After the smoke vents opened, the temperature slowly decreased and
stabilized around 30°C for the remainder of the simulation. The slice file results at 460 seconds are
shown in Figure 77.
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Figure 77. FDS slice file results for temperature at the upper balcony at 460 seconds.
Finally, the visibility was assessed at the top balconies. The visibility criteria of 13 meters was met at
areas where occupants would be located by a time of 420 seconds, as shown in Figure 78.

Figure 78. FDS slice file result for visibility at the upper balcony at 420 seconds.
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Since the detection time was so high, this would technically indicate that these occupants would not
evacuate in time before the visibility is too low. However, as previously discussed it is not likely that the
occupants would wait for an alarm with such a large fire growing on a stage during a show being
watched. The upper balcony had a movement time of 65 seconds, which would mean that the
occupants would need to begin egressing at 355 seconds after the fire started to all be out of the space
before this tenability criteria is met. Since the smoke began to spread to the seating area at 200
seconds, and the fire would be 6 MW it is fairly likely that the occupants would begin to egress by then.
For reference, a 6 MW compartment fire is shown below in Figure 79, taken from NIST fire test results.
Although this is a compartment fire and may appear differently than a fire in an open space, it
demonstrates the very large size of 6 MW fire.

Figure 79. 6 MW fire from NIST fire test. [13]
Therefore, although it cannot be explicitly stated, the threat to the occupants due to lack of visibility is
likely low. Since the tenability at the highest balcony was met, the lower balcony tenability was also
considered. The 13 meter visibility criteria was reached at the lower balcony at a time of 460 seconds, as
shown below in Figure 80.
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Figure 80. FDS slice file result for visibility at the lower balcony at 460 seconds.
Similar to the upper balcony, the lower balcony had a short egress time of 70 seconds, meaning that the
occupants would need to begin evacuating at 390 seconds to be fully evacuated by the time of the
tenability criteria being reached. For similar reasoning to the upper balcony, this is fairly likely.
To conclude, the only tenability criteria likely to threaten the occupants would be a lack of visibility. The
assessment of risk for the occupants is difficult due to the lack of a concrete detection time. Based on
engineering judgement of the size of fire, it is not likely that the occupants would wait long enough to
begin evacuation for them to still be present when the visibility might cause them to become lost.
Additionally, the balcony seating is not a large open space and the occupants may still be able to find
their way through the aisles to the exit even in low visibility conditions. Therefore, for the purposes of
this report, the Christopher Cohan Center meets the performance criteria and is likely safe for
occupants, with some room for improvement.

Recommendations
While it was found that the Christopher Cohan Center should be safe for occupants based on the
performance based design, there is some room for improvement to their fire protection systems. The
sprinkler system in the Christopher Cohan Center is still slightly under supplied with water. This issue
could be addressed by improving the water supply, adding a fire pump, or by making some changes to
the pipe sizes to provide less pressure losses. Based on the water supply nearly meeting the demand,
the best approach would likely be to reassess the sprinkler system within the building to create a lower
demand. A possible location to make this change could be in the layout of the branchlines at the catwalk
level.
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Figure 81. Catwalk level sprinklers
The sprinklers shown on the far right of the remote area in Figure 81 are all attached by armovers from
the nearby branchline. Because of the layout of these sprinklers, enough water to supply eight sprinklers
needs to flow through the branchline, rather than the four sprinklers for other branchlines. Increasing
the pipe sizes for this branchline will cause less pressure loss to the end sprinkler, which will help lower
the sprinkler demand. The sprinklers were also found to activate very late, in part due to having
standard response sprinklers and their activation temperature being 200 °F. This sprinkler temperature
should be assessed to determine whether the activation temperature could be reduced. If the ambient
temperatures at the roof level are not expected to be very high, the sprinklers could be replaced with
quick response sprinklers with a lower ordinary temperature rating, such as 175 °F. With an RTI value of
50 and an activation temperature of 175 °F (354 K), the sprinklers would operate much earlier at about
420 seconds. This would work well with the roof vents since they are expected to open around this time
and will likely still open. The sprinkler activation with these changes is shown below in Figure 82.

Figure 82. Sprinkler activation times with revised sprinklers.
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In addition to the late sprinkler activation and lack of adequate water supply, the detection present in
the stage area was found to be inadequate without relying on manual activation. To avoid this, beam
detection could be considered. Beam detectors could detect the fire earlier than spot-type smoke or
heat detection. The drawback with beam detection would be accidental activation due to stage effects
(for example, if a show featured smoke machines) or object intrusion. It should be assessed whether
stage effects could cause accidental activation based on the type of effects typically used in shows. Most
new beam detectors have the ability to determine a solid object from smoke or dust, and beams can be
placed outside the catwalk areas where people may be walking. A new FDS model was run to determine
what the activation time of the beam detection would be at varying obscuration cutoffs. The beam
detector was placed just under the ceiling for the most conservative results, but could be placed lower
in practice. The reflective beam detector made by Edwards (Kidde EC 50R) is provided with cutoff levels
ranging from 25 to 50% obscuration. For an obscuration of 25%, the fire was detected at 67 seconds
while the 50% obscuration was reached at 96 seconds. Based on this information, it is recommended
that the higher setting would be used to reduce the likelihood of a false alarm due to dust or stage
effects. Even at the higher obscuration setting, the fire is detected much faster than with only sprinklers
and would provide early enough detection to provide safety based on the performance criteria assessed.

Conclusion
This report analyzed the fire protection and life safety systems of the Christopher Cohan Center. The
building was assessed from both a prescriptive and performance-based approach.
The prescriptive design analyzed the code requirements for the building based on the 2018 IBC, with
some consideration for the codes in place at the time of construction. The prescriptive analysis main
focus was on egress systems, fire alarm and detection, fire suppression, and structural fire protection.
The egress analysis found that the exits and exit configuration were sufficient for the occupant loads
that were calculated for the building. The fire alarm and detection system was found to meet the
requirements for providing an emergency voice evacuation system and most of the locations of required
devices. However, it was found that smoke detector spacing in some spaces was insufficient and that
there may have been a lack of coordination for the placement and monitoring of duct detectors. The
building is equipped with an automatic fire sprinkler system and is provided with required monitoring
components and was designed in accordance with NFPA 13. The initial installation of the fire sprinkler
system would have met the code requirements, as the water supply with a fire pump was able to meet
the most demanding remote area. However, the fire sprinkler system in the building was modified by
the removal of a fire pump, which resulted in a slight deficiency in water supply. The structural fire
protection was found to meet the prescriptive code requirements of the 2018 IBC for heights, areas, and
occupancy separation requirements. As part of the prescriptive portion of the report, two design fires
were modeled to assess the affects of fire on the strength of the steel members. One design fire found
that the member may fail, although this was a worst-case fire for a single member and significant
structural failure may not occur from a single failure. The main issue found in the prescriptive analysis
was the lack of sufficient water supply for the fire sprinkler system, which could be addressed as
described in the recommendations portion of this report.
The performance-based analysis was performed based on design fires and tenability criteria. The
tenability criteria were toxicity, heat flux, temperature, and visibility. The limits were set at 683 ppm for
CO concentration, 5.75 kW/m2 for heat flux, 60 °C for temperature and 13 meters for visibility. Two
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design fires were considered, however one design fire on the stage was chosen to be analyzed in further
detail with an FDS model. The design fire considered a scenario where both the fire sprinkler system
failed to control the fire and where the 2-hour rated proscenium curtain failed to activate. A Pathfinder
model was also used to determine the egress time from the main hall, where the design fire was
located. The performance-based analysis found that occupants would be able to egress from main hall,
and that tenability would be maintained largely in part due to the activation of the smoke exhaust vents
at the top of the stage. While the performance-based requirements were met, some recommendations
were made including the improvement of the sprinkler system as well as the improvement of the
detection system in the stage area. With the improvement of the detection system in the stage area,
smoke vents could open earlier and the proscenium curtain could be activated automatically with the
implementation of projected beam smoke detection.
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Appendix B: Initiating Devices Plans (Not to Scale)
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Appendix C: Notification Appliances Plans
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Appendix D: Riser Diagram and Calculations
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Appendix E: Fire Alarm Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Initial Acceptance Testing
The initial acceptance testing of the fire alarm system is covered by the requirements of NFPA 72
Chapter 14. In fact, NFPA 72 states the following:
14.4.1.1 All new systems shall be inspected and tested in accordance with the requirements of
Chapter 14.
The commentary explains that in effect, this statement requires that the entirety of the inspection,
testing and maintenance requirements which are covered in Chapter 14 must be addressed at the initial
acceptance testing. This means that every device and every circuit must be tested for proper
functionality as intended by the code and design documents. Instead of going through every component
of the system and stating that it must be inspected and tested (and fixed, if needed), the user can read
through the following sections on the periodic requirements and realize that the first time these
periodic inspections will occur will be at acceptance testing, and then at the required interval going
forward.

Inspection
Inspections are intended to function as a visual confirmation that system components have not been
damaged, without being as invasive as testing can be. Therefore, inspection requirements are generally
for shorter intervals with testing happening less often to further confirm the functioning of the system.
Inspection also includes confirming that other building elements such as a change in occupancy or
environmental conditions has been or will be addressed by the fire alarm system. Generally, the entire
system must be inspected annually to confirm these building changes (or lack thereof), changes in
device locations, physical obstructions, and cleanliness. In addition to this overall inspection, many
devices are required to be visually inspected halfway through the year as well. The following Table
14.3.1 from NFPA 72 covers the specific timing and method of inspection of the system components.
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Figure 83. NFPA 72 Table 14.3.1: Inspection requirements (reserved sections removed in some instances).
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As discussed previously, the IBC states that ongoing inspections must follow the requirements of the IFC
and NFPA 72. However, the IFC simply states the following regarding inspections:
907.8.5 The building owner shall be responsible to maintain the fire and life safety systems in an
operable condition at all times. Service personnel shall meet the qualification requirements of
NFPA 72 for inspection, testing, and maintenance of such systems. Records of inspection,
testing, and maintenance shall be maintained.
Therefore, the building owner must ensure they are following the requirements put forth by NFPA 72 for
inspection.

Testing
Testing is an important addition to visual inspection as it provides a higher level of certainty that the
system is functioning as designed. Testing is more invasive to the building’s normal usage and is
generally not required as often as inspection is. In addition to acceptance testing and periodic testing,
NFPA 72 requires reacceptance testing when new devices, notification appliances, or control relays are
added. However, it is not required that the whole system be retested, only the parts which were
affected by the change. If the system executive software is changed, 10% of the system must be tested
for functionality including at least one device on each input and output circuit to verify critical system
functions.
In addition to tests required when changes are made, periodic testing is required for system
components. The code does state that concessions such as using silent testing mode can be used to
reduce the “negative” impact to building occupants. The goal of this is to reduce the idea of false alarms
and to keep occupants from becoming too normalized to the operating of the system, which may cause
them to ignore an actual alarm signal. The goal is to avoid “cry wolf” syndrome while still properly
ensuring the system function.
NFPA 72 again provides a table with the interval and test method for each system component. However,
this table is rather lengthy and would not provide much to this report. Therefore, some pa rts of the
table as they pertain to the main devices discussed in this report are provided in the following picture.
For the full summary of the required testing, the reader should refer to NFPA 72 Table 14.4.3.2.
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Figure 84. NFPA 72 Table 14.4.3.2 (some relevant sections): Testing requirements for fire alarm systems.
As it can be seen, testing requirements are much more in depth than the simple visual inspections. Most
of the main devices are required to be tested yearly, with a few being required more or less often. The
building official can choose one day a year to do a total inspection of the system, and also perform
testing on all the devices that require annual testing.
As discussed, the IBC states that both the requirements of the IFC and NFPA 72 must be followed. The
only additional information provided by the IFC is the following, on smoke detector sensitivity:
907.8.3 Smoke detector sensitivity. Smoke detector sensitivity shall be checked within one year
after installation and every alternate year thereafter. After the second calibration test where
sensitivity test indicate that the detector has remained within its listed and marked sensitivity
range, the length of time between calibration tests shall be permitted to be extended to not
more than 5 years.
Therefore, the smoke detector sensitivity test should be incorporated with the testing that is required
by NFPA 72.

Maintenance
Maintenance requirements for fire alarm systems are more straightforward than inspection and testing
requirements, and make sure that identified problems are addressed. Maintenance also helps keep
devices clean and functioning properly when proper maintenance intervals are followed, which can help
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prevent a device from functioning improperly in the first place. When a component is found to be
working improperly or broken, it must either be repaired or replaced by a qualified service professional.
Additionally, components must be maintained and cleaned following the procedures and frequency
given by the equipment manufacturer, as required by NFPA 72 Section 14.5.
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Appendix F: Fire Sprinkler Piping Layout
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Appendix G: Hydraulic Calculations
Remote area with all nodes labeled:

From 41, down to upper balcony level:
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From 39, down to main level:
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Hydraulic Calculation Output:
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Appendix H: Automatic Sprinkler System Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Initial Acceptance Testing
The initial acceptance testing of the fire sprinkler system is covered by the requirements of NFPA 13 Chapter 25. There
are various tests that are required to be performed and are summarized as follows (with referenced NFPA 13, 2016
edition sections) for tests that are applicable to this building:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

25.2.1 Hydrostatic Tests: System is charged to 200 psi and must maintain that pressure without loss for 2 hours.
This test ensures that there are no leaks within the system, which would cause the pressure to drop.
25.2.3.1 Waterflow Devices: Waterflow detecting devices (and associated fire alarm signals) are tested by
flowing water through the inspector’s test connection. An alarm signal must be activated within 5 minutes after
flow begins.
25.2.3.3.1 Preaction Systems: The automatic operation of the preaction valve must be tested in accordance
with the manufacturer’s instructions. Remote and manual operations must also be tested.
25.2.3.4 Main Drain Valves: The main drain valve must be opened and stay open until the system pressure is
stabilized.
25.2.3.5 Operating Test for Control Valves: All control valves must be closed and opened under system water
pressure to ensure proper operation.
25.2.4 Pressure-Reducing Valves: Pressure reducing valves must be tested to verify that the device regulates
outlet pressure under flow and no-flow conditions.
25.2.5 Backflow Prevention Assemblies: The backflow prevention assembly must be forward flow tested to
ensure proper operation.

Additionally, a hydraulic design information sign and a general information sign must both be provided in accordance
with Sections 25.5 and 25.6, respectively.

Routine Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Inspections are intended to function as a visual confirmation that system components have not been damaged, without
being as invasive as testing can be. Therefore, inspection requirements are generally for shorter intervals with testing
happening less often to further confirm the functioning of the system. Inspection also includes confirming that other
building elements such as a change in occupancy or environmental conditions has been or will be addressed by the fire
sprinkler system. Testing is an important addition to visual inspection as it provides a higher level of certainty that the
system is functioning as designed. Testing is more invasive to the building’s normal usage and is generally not required
as often as inspection is. The following Table 5.1.1.2 from NFPA 25 covers the specific timing and method of inspection
of the system components.
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Appendix I: Fire Resistance Plans
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Appendix J: Structural Plans
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